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Abstract
By bringing the machinic ontology of Gilles Deleuze and Félix Guattari, together with
Humberto Maturana and Francisco Varela’s machinic theory of autopoiesis, this thesis
presents a rethinking of world and identity in what we call the situation of contemporary
global modernity. It argues that worlds and identity co-arise with one another through a
poietic structuring. Globally, this is defined by organizational processes of autopoietic
capitalism that attempts to self-separate from worlds. These processes involve an ontology of
abstractive creation destruction, which continuously re-inscribe histories and identities in the
image of capitalism. Locally, worlds and identities are structured by allopoietic processes,
or, ontological and political machinations of becoming-other. This becoming-other
accommodates the global and specific identity of autopoietic capitalism in a local space and
history to form poietic subjects. We find that by holding ontology and politics together on
equal ground, new implications for political belonging and collective identity are revealed.
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Preface: Two Theories on Machines and the Living
Forty-five years ago Gilles Deleuze and Félix Guattari published the now infamous first
volume of Capitalism and Schizophrenia. Through a reconceptualization of the machine,
Anti-Oedipus at once traces the relentless individuation of late capitalist production while
also exposing how this impersonal process creates conditions within which individuals come
to desire their own repression for the sake of inclusion. Machines, then, are not the product of
human technē, nor a mere political metaphor for the ontological effects of capitalist
production. Rather, machines present a rethinking of ontology as immanent production and
production as eminently political, a critique of practical reason where desire simultaneously
forms connections, disjunctions, and conjunctions while constituting the territorial fields of
nature, society, politics, economics and culture.1 “It is functioning everywhere,” Deleuze and
Guattari write in the opening lines of their work, “sometimes without ending, sometimes
discontinuously. It breathes, it heats, it eats. It shits and fucks. What a mistake to have ever
said the id. Everywhere it is machines, and not at all metaphorically: machines from
machines, with their couplings, their connections. […] Something is produced: the effects of
machines and not metaphors.”2
In the same year, another landmark text on machines was published in the field of
biology by Humberto Maturana and Francisco Varela. Autopoiesis: The Organization of the
Living (originally titled in Spanish Of Machines and Living Beings) expounds a fierce
mechanistic framework that attempts to think what is common to all living systems. As such,
Maturana and Varela propose the theory of autopoiesis, or self-production, which defines
living systems as machines whose dynamic relations constitute a unity in space and allow for

1

See Daniel W. Smith, “Dialectics: Deleuze, Kant and the Theory of Immanent Ideas” in Essays on Deleuze
(Edinburgh: Edinburgh University Press, 2012), 106-121.
2

Gilles Deleuze and Félix Guattari, L’Anti-Oedipe: Capitalisme et schizophrénie (Paris: Les éditions de minuit,
1973), 7. Translation is modified from Anti-Oedipus: Capitalism and Schizophrenia, Trans. Robert Hurley,
Mark Seem, and Helen R. Lane (New York: Penguin Books, 2009), 1-2. While generally decent, I believe that
this standard translation of Anti-Oedipus has the tendency to obscure the structure statements, often rearranging
the order of words and at times excluding turns of phrase in order to achieve a certain coherence of style
throughout the text. As such, I will use my own translations of Anti-Oedipus throughout this paper, unless
otherwise indicated, and place the page number from the original French first, followed by the English
pagination in brackets. In this case, for example: 7(1-2). When the Hurley, Seem and Lane translation is used
only one page number will be indicated.
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the maintenance of identity through time. The decisive innovation of autopoiesis is to
conceive of the operational closure and structural coupling of living systems’ machinic selfproduction. Operational closure refers to the unitary organization of autopoietic machines as
being immanently closed to the outside, whereas structural coupling maintains that the
components of these machines must be eminently open to the outside. To this end, Maturana
and Varela’s work begins with “A universe comes into being when a space is severed in two.
A unity is defined.”3 Life and the definition of the living, then, remains incomprehensible
without this paradoxical exclusionary closure and inclusionary coupling.
Autopoietic machines produce their unitary identity according to their own internal
organization by severing a space in two, or, by closing themselves off. This closure forms
their world. But as they exist in physical space, they necessarily remain open to and are acted
upon by an environment. Identity in these circumstances comes to be understood as the open
transformation and destruction of an autopoietic machine’s structural components for the
sake of the closed survival of a unitary world. In this sense, world and identity are co-arising
for autopoietic machines, formed simultaneously through the internal relations of its
organization and external coupling of its structural components. This is why Maturana and
Varela will conclude, “Autopoietic systems define the world in which they can exist in
relation to their autopoiesis, and some interact recursively with this world through their
descriptions.”4
This is more than a mere synchronicity. Maturana and Varela’s theory of autopoiesis comes
to serve as an inspiration for Deleuze and Guattari’s refinement of their reconceptualization
of machines, and philosophy itself, toward the end of their lives.5 In their final collaborative

3

Humberto Maturana and Francisco Varela, Autopoiesis and Cognition: The Realization of the Living
(Dordrecht, Holland: D. Riedel Publishing Company, 1980), 73.
4

Ibid, 123.
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Indeed, while providing feedback for What is Philosophy? Guattari wrote to Deleuze in one instance that “I’d
like to suggest the theme of opposition between mixture and interaction. … About the brain’s operation on
itself: see Francisco Varela’s autopoetic systems. … I talked about this a little bit in “Machinic heterogenesis.”
See Félix Guattari, typed notes on What is Philosophy? IMEC Archives, quoted from François Dossé, Gilles
Deleuze & Félix Guattari: Intersecting Lives, trans. Deborah Glassman (New York: Columbia University Press,
2010), 15.
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work What is Philosophy?, the term autopoiesis appears only once, albeit, at a crucial
juncture that brings together the relationship of philosophy to reality, namely, with regards to
the status of the concept. Here, Deleuze and Guattari write that “the concept is not given, it is
created; it is to be created. It is not formed but posits itself in itself—it is a self-positing.
Creation and self-positing mutually imply each other because what is truly created, from the
living being to the work of art, thereby enjoys a self-positing of itself, or an autopoetic
characteristic by which it is recognized.”6 They continue on, in discussing the self-positing,
self-producing dynamic of the concept to return to their conceptualization of the machine.
Concepts, they claim, are akin to the configurations of the machine, with all its connections
to themselves and couplings to reality, to a space, a plane which itself is another machine.
The foregoing is an example of the productive possibilities in bringing together Maturana
and Varela’s theory of autopoiesis with Deleuze and Guattari’s reconceptualization of the
machine. Our path, influenced by Deleuze and Guattari, and Maturana and Varela, returns to
the relationship between ontology and politics within the purview of capitalism. What is of
interest is not so much the relationship between concepts and the world, but the way politics,
ontology, and an organization of the living can be wed to examine the co-arising of world
and identity in our present day situation where everything appears as ‘together-with-timeeverywhere-just-now.’7
Why is this intervention necessary? Part of this problem stems from the manner in which
identity has been said to be constructed and produced by the processes of globalization and
the enactment of global capitalism throughout the past few decades. In The Parallax View,
for example, Slavoj Žižek maintains that global capitalism’s ability to reproduce its
socioeconomic processes has created a ‘world-less’ horizon for globalization, one which
functions regardless of a specific history or tradition. Unlike previous socioeconomic
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Gilles Deleuze and Félix Guattari, What is Philosophy?, trans. Hugh Tomlinson and Graham Burchell (New
York: Columbia University Press, 1994), 11.
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This last formulation, ‘together-with-time-everywhere-just-now’, is my play on the etymologies of
‘contemporary’ (from the Latin con - together with – and tempus – time ) ‘global’ (globe, from Latin globus – a
sphere or ball – through Old French globe – either a, or relating to a sphere or globe, or concerning all parts of
the world –everywhere is invoked as a spatial metaphor) and ‘modernity’ (Medieval Latin, as a quality
modernus, from Latin modo, as just now in a certain manner).
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regimes, he states that global capitalism de-totalizes meaning with the effect that “(there is no
global ‘capitalist-worldview,’ no ‘capitalist civilization’ proper—the fundamental lesson of
globalization is precisely that capitalism can accommodate itself to all civilizations, from
Christian to Hindu and Buddhist); its global dimension can be formulated only at the level of
truth-without-meaning, as the “Real” of the global market mechanism.”8 Similarly, in
describing globalization avant la lettre, Niklas Luhmann posits that “in spite of all the
political borders that exist within it, today there is only one world society,” which produces
the effect that “everyone’s experience is contemporary.”9 More than simply being
contemporary, however, we must claim that global capitalism’s injunction for worldlessness
creates a situation which could be described as contemporary global modernity: namely, a
uniform horizon within which politics always already guarantees a culture that continuously
conforms to the actualization of profit ‘together-with-time-everywhere-just-now.’
By returning to a conceptualization of world within the situation of contemporary global
modernity, our investigation begins precisely with the question of borders, of relations
between an inside and outside, the global and the local, with the co-arising of world and
identity. Motivated by the productive possibilities of bringing together Deleuze and Guattari
with Maturana and Varela, this thesis shall develop a theory of world creation termed the
poietic structuring of worlds. In this regard, we hope also to stage a reconsideration of the
relationship between ontology and politics, which will claim that they too must be
understood through a dynamic of co-arising. One reason to think ontology and politics
together, particularly when considering the concept of world, is precisely as a means to avoid
any lingering traces of onto-theology in the assessment of contemporary global modernity.
Capitalism may very well occupy a sort of religious hold on the global subject today; as
Mackenzie Wark writes (in a way that is reminiscent of Mario Tronti) “the only thing worse

8

Slavoj Žižek, The Parallax View (Cambridge, Massachusetts: The MIT Press, 2009), 181.

9

Niklas Luhmann, Ausdifferenzierung des Rechts: Beiträge zur Rechtssoziologie vmd Rechtstheorie
(Suhrkamp, Frankfurt am Main, 1981), quoted from Roberto Esposito, Immunitas: The Protection and Negation
of Life, trans. Zakiya Hanafi (London: Polity Press, 2014), 46.
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than being exploited is not being exploited.”10 But while such statements capture the
precarious nature of subjective desire, they say nothing as to how such a desire is created
both for a subject’s identity and within their world. Identity is not static, it is always a
becoming. The worlds produced to support capitalism reflect such a dynamism. And this
dynamic relation comes to be inscribed within the production of capitalism itself, such that it
cannot form a singular principle of being, but necessitates a constant process of becoming.
Thus, when Žižek writes that ‘the fundamental lesson of globalization is precisely that
capitalism can accommodate itself to all civilizations’ what he misses is that it is not so much
a question of capitalism ‘accommodating’ itself to various ‘civilizations’. Here is the second
part of our problem: capitalism does not form a natural order which separates itself from all
political or social life.11 Capitalism always already requires a society, a world in particular
and worlds in general. Thus, participation in the global market necessitates the production of
local, individualized meaning within a particular culture that is nonexchangeable and yet
makes the universal truth of the market mechanisms present in local space and history. If
there seems to be something like a worldless horizon within global capitalism, it is only
because it’s truly global dimension arrives in its ability to nullify not only rural
provincialism, but also urban diversity by continuously recreating society to the singular
demand of the generation of profit. As such, it is local, individualized meaning that
accommodates global capitalism to its-self, and this accommodation is what capitalism
requires for the survival of its organization through time and its structure within space.
The wager of this thesis, then, is as follows: first, that global financial capitalism should be
described as an autopoietic machine whose global, particular identity can be defined as the
production of profit from profit itself. Second, the interior organization of capitalism relies
on the proliferation of local, non-particular worlds for the survival of its identity; local
worlds accommodate autopoietic capitalism, and function as its structure by producing
social, political and ontological relations to guarantee its survival. Third, the local, non-

10

Mackenzie Wark, “Inventing the Future,” Public Seminar (October 27th, 2015) np. Accessed on: May 6th,
2016. DOI: http://www.publicseminar.org/2015/10/inventing-the-future/
11

See Wolfgang Streeck, How will Capitalism End? Essays on a Failing System (London: Verso Books, 2016).
We will address some of Streeck’s positions throughout the body of this thesis.
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particular worlds of global capitalism can thus be defined as allopoietic, that is, machines
which tend toward the production of something other than themselves. Finally, that these
worlds need to become naturalized for individual subjects to form a new collective identity,
an onomatopoeial process, that comes to stand in for individual subjects themselves by
continuously making the global and specific identity of autopoietic capitalism present, a
prosopopoeial process. This allows for the formation of poietic subjects, whose identity is
non-exchangeable with other local worlds or the global, autopoietic functioning of
capitalism, but comes to be understood as non-specific insofar as their forms of dwelling tend
towards the reproduction of profit. Taken together, these processes describe a poietic
structuring of worlds and identities.
In our first chapter, what is at stake is a description of the situation of contemporary global
modernity. In order to outline common narratives which describe financial global
capitalism’s and globalization’s disposition towards the world in general and worlds in
particular, problematics of exhaustion and containment are thought in relation to the concept
of world and examined through the work of Franco ‘Bifo’ Berardi, Frederic Jameson, and
Peter Sloterdijk. In these views, it appears as though capitalism’s ever accelerating processes
of abstraction tends toward replacing the quality of a world with the monetized quantity of a
financialized globe. We argue, however, that such descriptions mistake how we are here in a
world with what there is in the globe, namely, ‘commodity, text, number, image and
celebrity’ and abstract combinations of communication. Thus, we pose the central question of
this chapter: do we still live in a world? This question is invoked both for its ontological and
political significance. If it appears as though we no longer live in a world, we argue that it is
precisely owing to a series on ontological mis-alliances between the political and the social,
and the economic and cultural, which continuously conforms to the actualization of profit
‘together-with-time-everywhere-just-now.’ To overcome this deadlock of thinking, we argue
that it is necessary to think world and identity together, through and within politics and
ontology, by positing the poietic structuring of worlds and identity outlined above.
Chapter two takes up the tension between the notions of world and worlds within the
functioning of global financial capitalism. This tension allows for the theorization of the
autopoietic and global dimension of the poietic structuring of worlds in the situation of
contemporary global modernity. To this end, financial capitalism is first thought through two
x

of its main organizational characteristics, namely, real abstraction and creative destruction.
The work of ‘Bifo’ once again serves as our starting point, invoked here for its creative
theoretical matrix which emphasizes the thought of Deleuze and Guattari along with Italian
autonomist Marxism. Working through Bifo’s analysis of abstraction provides us with a
historically grounded reading of capitalism’s development, while also allowing us to situate
certain key terms for Deleuze and Guattari. I argue that although global financial capitalism
wishes to be rid of the world, to become frictionless self-creation, or autopoietic, it
necessarily relies on worlds for its reproduction. Thus, financial capitalism only becomes
autopoietic by creating a dimension of global, particular, truth, which simultaneously
abstracts from the world and is accommodated by worlds through means of creative
destruction. A brief history of the relationship between capitalism and the theory of
autopoiesis ensues for the sake of developing three main processes of the later: structural
coupling, operational closure, and reciprocal causality. The work of Sir Stafford Beer and the
late work of Guattari is invoked here to provide us with a way to think through the
connection between a biological theory of living and the organization of human sociopolitical life. Finally, financial capitalism’s abstractive creative destruction is read through
and within the paradigm of autopoiesis, as a means to trace how capitalism comes to embody
an autopoietic dimension of worlds in the situation of contemporary global modernity. The
last part of our chapter stages a creative re-reading of the three passive syntheses of
production from Deleuze and Guattari’s machinic ontology, namely, connection, disjunction,
and conjunction through the organizational characteristics of the theory of autopoiesis. Our
aim is to update Anti-Oedipus’ concrete articulation of the relationship between capitalism,
politics and ontology by thinking them through and alongside the situation of contemporary
global modernity.
The third chapter brings together our previous discussion of autopoietic capitalism and global
life with an examination of local, allopoietic world creation and the formation of poietic
subjects. It thus begins with a theoretical exploration of allopoietic world creation, focusing
on the function of prosopopoeial and onomatopoeial processes which make the global,
autopoietic dimension of financial capitalism present to a local world by re-inscribing the
history of that world within this autopoietic dimension so as it naturalize its transformation,
destruction, and re-creation for its subjects. We then argue that the co-arising of local worlds
xi

and identity in the situation of contemporary global modernity (re)presents an allopoietic
becoming-other which is always contingent, but owing to the functioning of autopoietic
capitalism, come to be understood within a universal necessity. To give life to this theoretical
discussion, the recent history of China’s economic, social, and political reforms are explored
through a reading of Deleuze and Guattari’s notion of the socius. This allows us to rethink
identity within the problems of borders and boundaries, and to understand how the allopoietic
processes of world creation bring about new political and ontological forms of inclusion and
exclusion. The final two sections of this chapter respectively take up inclusion and exclusion
by examining the lives of migrant workers and nail-house inhabitants in China’s new
allopoietic world, one which can be understood as embodying the organizational principles
of creative destruction in its reconstruction of urban space. Cinematic representations of the
reconfiguration of space in China and interviews with nail-house protests are invoked in this
regard as a means to begin to think again about how we are here in a world in the situation of
contemporary global modernity.
In conclusion, I lay out the implications of thinking autos, allos and world through a poietic
structuring in the situation of contemporary global modernity. Namely, the poietic structuring
of worlds and identities entails the unification of thought and action in a particular time and
space so as to continue a local world, even though this unification is founded on a becomingother, a series of ontological, political, and historical discontinuities without breaks. Thus, we
come to an understanding that the global and local dimensions of world and identity are
inextricably intertwined, that the global must continually be made present in the local, that
the global depends upon the local for its coherence, and that the local thus tends towards the
reproduction of the global, something other than itself. Finally, while I seek to develop a
macrocosmic perspective of world and identity in this thesis, its theorization is far from
complete, especially where allopoietic processes of world creation and the formation of
poietic subjects are concerned. As such, I close my thesis by raising objections to my
theorizations of the poietic structuring of worlds, as a means to suggest future possibilities
for research.
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1

The Situation of Contemporary Global Modernity
1.1

Do We Still Live in a World?

The world is exhausted: how is this statement to be understood? On a first glance, this
situation evokes nothing but fatigued (and yet increasingly urgent) narratives. First, a
socio-scientific consciousness that is rightly consumed by implications of bio-ecological
ruin, namely, the exhaustion of the world as an impending collapse of life. Second, a
socio-political imaginary that endlessly consumes ruinous visions of a future unable to
escape the implications of global capitalism. To this end, and to repeat the formula
commonly attributed to Fredric Jameson, “someone once said that it is easier to imagine
the end of the world than to imagine the end of capitalism.”12 Indeed, the pervading
common sense of our time is captured by Peter Sloterdijk when he claims that we have
been caught up within “the most effective totalization, the unification of the world
through money in all its transformations – as commodity, text, number, image and
celebrity.”13 Under these conditions, wherein any evocation of ‘world’ is immediately
subsumed within the totalizing order of capitalist financialisation, it seems impossible to
even go to the end of Jameson’s statement. In the place of amending the order of
“capitalism by way of imagining the end of the world,” a strategy for biological survival,
we instead are restrained by (re)visions that seem “to be nothing but a monotonous
repetition of what is already here.”14 In this sense, the belief in capitalism’s irreversibility
and infinite repetition lobotomizes ‘worldliness,’ understood as a living and created
relationality of meaning in which individuals, persons, and communities are implicated,
through which they come to care for one another, and within which they come to
understand their-selves and their identity.

12

Frederic Jameson, “Future City,” New Left Review 21 (May-June 2003): np.
https://newleftreview.org/II/21/fredric-jameson-future-city
13

Peter Sloterdijk, In The World Interior of Capitalism: Towards a Philosophical Theory of Globalization,
trans. Wieland Hoban (London: Polity Press, 2013), 7.
14

Jameson, “Future City”. Both quotations are from Jameson’s essay.
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The totalization of the world through capitalism ends up signaling the erasure of the
concept itself. In a short but crucially insightful section of his And: Phenomenology of the
End, Franco ‘Bifo’ Berardi claims that the process of abstraction, what Karl Marx
described as the main trend to describe the relationship between the economy and the
Real world, must be thought along the lines of invisibilization. He proposes the term
Semiocapitalism as a means to describe the present configuration of capitalism.
Semiocapitalism emphasizes the absolute coincidence between the production of goods
(material or immaterial) and their translation into abstract combinations of
communication (algorithms, figures, digital differences). “In the Indust-Reality,” Berardi
explains, “the invisible goal of abstract valorization was obtained by physical
manipulation of visible things. Semiocapitalism dissolves the visible process of
production, and financial capitalism, at last, is the utter dissolution of the sphere of
visibility and the melting of capital accumulation into the abstract kingdom of virtual
exchange.”15 With the dissolution of the sphere of visibility comes the destruction of the
soul, the principle of life: the affective, intellectual and libidinal forces that weave a
world together are lost, thereby amounting to nothing other than the invisibilization of the
world as such.16 The engine of capitalist production tends towards the ever greater
invisibilization of the world, and with this increasing invisibilization comes the
acceleration of production freed from material referent. To this end, Berardi remarks
elsewhere that today we find ourselves dwelling on “a continent of exhaustion.”17 No
world without capitalism, no capitalism without exhaustion, and no exhaustion without
containment in the globe.

15

Franco ‘Bifo’ Berardi, And: Phenomenology of the End: Cognition and Sensibility in the Transition from
the Conjunctive to Connective Mode of Social Communication (Unigrafia, Finland: Aalto University,
2014), 92-94.
16

On relationship between the notion of the soul and the world, see Jason Smith’s “Preface” to Franco
‘Bifo’ Berardi, The Soul at Work: From Alienation to Autonomy, trans. Francesca Cadel and Giuseppina
Mecchia (Cambridge, Massachusetts: semiotext(e), 2009), 9-20.
17

Franco ‘Bifo’ Berardi, “Reassessing Recomposition: 40 Years After the Publication of Anti-Oedipus,”
December 3, 2012. http://th-rough.eu/writers/bifo-eng/reassessing-recomposition-40-years-afterpublication-anti-oedipus
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These global narratives present but one side of the exhaustion of the world, that which is
readily visible. Or, given the emphasis that was just placed on Berardi’s notion of the
invisibilization of the world, perhaps it would be more prudent to claim that this
presentation is that which is forcibly made visible through capitalism’s ever accelerating
process of replacing the quality of the world with the monetized quantity of a
financialized globe. What is made visible in this obverse presentation is what
immediately appears there in the globe, what is produced everywhere through
globalization —‘commodity, text, number, image and celebrity’ and abstract
combinations of communication all elide rather than explain the reverse of how we are
here. Thus, in the substitution and cancellation of the world for the globe what is
operationalized is not simply a terminological difference, but a conceptual array of
ontological, socio-political, and cultural implications.
While the terms globe and world are often used interchangeably, Jacques Derrida
captures the significance of their terminological slippage in his distinction between the
English globe and globalization and the French monde and mondialisation. The concept
of the globe purportedly invokes a neutral geometric and geographical formation, a
sphere, removed from a particular history or socio-cultural origin, and globalization a
process of universal inevitability tending towards material self-completion, or autofinality.18 “If I maintain the distinction between these concepts [of monde and
mondialisation] and the concepts of globalization,” Derrida writes, “it is because the
concept of world [monde] gestures towards a history, it has a memory that distinguishes it
from that of the globe, of the universe, of Earth.”19 The globe in this sense can be
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understood as an ontic container, whose circular, self-referential trajectory accounts for
everything just now, without history and without worldliness. Alberto Toscano repeats
Derrida’s definition in a different register, claiming that it is not only globalization but
capitalism’s trend toward abstraction that results in a particular worldlessness, or the
emptying of the historical socio-political content of the world for the material referent of
the globe. This abstraction, he claims, must be understood as the ontology of capitalism
itself.20 Benjamin Noys aptly summarizes Toscano’s reading of abstraction qua ontology
of capitalism as follows: “first, the concrete articulation of reality as a series of
differences, and second, the void of its absence of determinations, the lack of a historical
or cultural content to capital.”21 To differentiate between globe and world in relation to
global capitalism and globalization, then, is to begin the task of rethinking the situation of
how we are here within its immanently ontological and eminently political and historical
nature.
There is nothing metaphysical in this last formulation. To ask how we are here is not to
forsake the present in a search for origins, to retrieve some first order principle that would
explain the peculiarity of this situation. Rather, it is to seek out what has truly been
rendered invisible through the global capitalist totalization of the world into a globe, to
unfold the series of differences between the global and the local, and to once again raise
the question of the relationship between an inside and an outside. It is to resist the idea of
the capitalist globe as a monad, as an absolute folding of the outside world to the inside
of the globe, a formula and a site that has “no windows, by which anything could come in
or go out,” as Gilles Deleuze writes in The Fold: Leibniz and the Baroque.22 It is to take
seriously Deleuze and Félix Guattari’s claim in What is Philosophy? that “believing in
this world, in this life, becomes our most difficult task, or the task of a mode of existence
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still to be discovered on our plane of immanence today. This is the empiricist conversion
(we have so many reasons not to believe in the human world; we have lost the world,
worse than a fiancée or God). The problem has indeed changed.”23 Not to think what
there is in the world, then, a problem captured solely within the coordinates of capitalism
which seem to produce a frictionless metonymy of the global for the local, totality for
part. But, rather, by renewing the problem of how we are here we may catch a glimpse of
that forgotten exergue impressed upon the surface our times: do we still live in a world?
To address this seemingly simple question, it is necessary to move beyond the purview of
global capitalism as the sole determination of the world. Rather, the functioning of global
capitalism must be held together with its correlative process of globalization if we are to
avoid its elevation into a natural order, a new metaphysics of onto-theology which
defines the first cause of the world as globe. What seems to be forgotten in the definitions
and various terminologies of global capitalism that have been outlined thus far is that
while capitalism relies on the trend of abstraction as a means to counteract its own
tendency towards the falling rate of surplus value, it also needs a society. “Once upon a
time sociologists knew that modern society is capitalist society,” Wolfgang Streeck
remarks, “that capitalism is not one thing – a particular kind of economy – and modern
society another.”24 More forcefully even, we should emphasize that in addition to
capitalism needing a society it needs a society to become capitalist, to become modern
according to its own image. Capitalism needs a whole series of becomings – a becomingsociety, a becoming-politics, a becoming-culture – in order to continuously ensure its
totalizing processes of the unification of the world into the globe. To invoke globalization
alongside the becomings of global capitalism, then, is to emphasize processes of
abstraction alongside the necessary development of modernization. Capitalism needs to
secure not only time but space for its own totalizing ends of erasing the world for the
sake of a globe. Terms such as Semiocapitalism, or even global capitalism, fail to
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describe these processes. What is made invisible is not only the world itself, but
capitalism’s various becomings. We propose the term contemporary global modernity as
a means to explain this situation where capitalism’s globalization tends towards the
singular production of conditions that are always seen as being ‘together-with-timeeverywhere-just-now.’
If it appears as though we no longer live in a world, that we exist within a uniform
horizon of the globe, it is precisely owing to the fact that the unifying situation of
contemporary global modernity relies on a series of ontological misalliances to produce
and secure its status as reality itself. In this regard, ontology may be defined as the
enterprise which seeks to answer the questions ‘what is existence’ or ‘what does
existence mean.’ To claim that contemporary global modernity is structured by a series of
ontological mis-alliances, then, is to claim that capitalism substitutes local ontological
implications of existence for the global metaphysical application of its singular reality.
Deleuze and Guattari capture this distinction in Anti-Oedipus when they describe how
capitalism increasingly transforms individuals into abstract quantities defined only by
their labour capacity and thereby reduces them to “a role of application, and no longer of
implication.”25 This situation, however, is not only immanently ontological but as we
previously insisted, eminently political. Political, here, may be defined as the local
instantiation of a way of life which governs the interactions of a society by determining
that which belongs inside its domain from that which is foreign, thereby guaranteeing itsself. Within contemporary global modernity, the political guarantee of a way of life is
supplemented for a singular law of dwelling: the economic.26 Defining the situation of
contemporary global modernity, and the manner in which capitalism conceals its own
becoming through a series of ontological mis-alliances, will form the first task of this
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chapter, insofar as it will allow us to begin to approach our question ‘do we still live in a
world?’
By raising the question of living in a world in relation to ontology and politics we
necessarily find ourselves in the terrain of identity as a social category. Thinking identity
in relation to ontology and politics has traditionally revolved around two axes: first, an
ontological turn to politics, wherein politics is seen to generate and secure the ground of
existence;27 second, a political turn to ontology, wherein political implications are drawn
out from purportedly apolitical and timeless ontologies.28 We will attempt to formulate a
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different option. The second task of this chapter is to posit a co-arising of world and
identity, namely, a dynamic that places the political and ontology together on equal
footing so as to create a new means to understand how identity is, and by extension, how
we are here locally in a world. This dynamic shall be called the poietic structuring of
worlds. It shall bring together Deleuze and Guattari’s theorization of capitalism in AntiOedipus, with Humberto Maturana’s and Francisco Varela’s theory of autopoiesis. A
world, then, can be understood as creating the conditions in which an identity can
ontologically be referred to as a “becoming for,” politically, a “becoming together,” and
socially as a “being with”; taken together, these three basic components work on, through
and with each other to form what may be defined as a unitary organization of living
together. The invocation of poïesis shall explain the particular manner in which worlds
and identities are inextricably intertwined with the situation of contemporary global
modernity, which is to say how they become unified. Thus, by understanding the coarising of world and identity through the poietic structuring of worlds, our theory forms a
viable alternation to the current framework of globalization by, first, emphasizing that the
global cannot exist without the local, and second, that the connection between the global
and the local entails a constant becoming-other of each.

1.2

The Ontological Mis-alliances of Contemporary
Global Modernity

With the rising prominence of identity politics, today we seem to speak primarily of
something like an ontological turn in the terrain of social production, academic
scholarship and general media coverage and reception of the Left.29 As William E.
Connolly writes in the “Foreword” to A Leftist Ontology: Beyond Relativism and Identity
Politics, “the ontological dimension of political thought and practice is robust, even while
it may be marked by internal tensions, and a case can be made that the attempt to
expunge this element from political thought recoils back on theory, making it less active
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and robust than it otherwise might be.”30 To a large extent this same tension between the
not unlikely but rather unwieldy bedfellows of the political and the philosophical (that
there is a sort of natural and assumed, and thus nigh in-articulable connexion is evident
enough) can be already be inscribed in the ‘origins’ of both disciplines. This is a problem,
as Jacques Rancière would maintain in his Disagreements, that is as old as philosophy
itself,31 and that can be summed up by the neat dichotomy contained in the center of
Raphael’s “School Of Athens”: do we point to the sky and erect a Platonic transcendental
structure of reason whose values resonate outwards, or do we ground ourselves firmly on
the floor of the earth, beginning only with what is readily apparent, in conventional
Aristotelian fashion?
This portrait is obviously fallacious, rudimentary, and lacking insight. But when we
speak of an ontological turn to the ‘thought and practice’ of politics proper, we seem to
find ourselves returned precisely to this fundamentally poor choice. Either we begin with
utopian (or impossible) demands rooted in transcendental, timeless, inalienable universal
structures of human, animal, social rights and then filter down to the level of concrete
critique in order to demonstrate how their espousal has failed to be guaranteed; or we
plant the seeds of the polis to come within the soil of subjective (or ‘relativist’ to use
Connolly’s term) lived experience of particular subjects that while located in a particular
time and bearing the mark of a bleeding history must come to represent a universal
injunction to name (in)justice. In effect, the result of either option is the same. Once the
movement from subject to universal, or universal to subject, is effectuated, how does one
either return to the sky or come back down to the earth to produce an effect on the center
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of belief from which all transactions of meaning are produced and within which all the
coordinates of identity are fixed within ever growing concentric circles of exclusion:
namely, to what extent can these solutions disorient, disrupt, or actually change anything
other than the social codes of our current socio-political matrix?32 Ultimately, each
pathway always already begins with the failure to articulate a new mode of thinking and
practice that is able to effect a complete return to its starting place, thereby producing a
deterministic framework for identity.
This deterministic framework for identity comes to be mirrored, albeit in an asymmetrical
way, in the manner in which theorizations of global capitalism take up the notion of the
world. Let us begin, then, by advancing the following claim: our engagement with the
world of contemporary global modernity is endemically structured by two sets of misalliances. A first set emerges in the form of what, to once again invoke Jacques
Rancière’s Dis-agreement, could be described as the persistent collapsing of the political
into the social, or the becoming political of the social and the becoming social of the
political. To understand this dynamic as being out of sorts, as forming an incongruent
coupling, would appear to be antithetical to Rancière’s entire argument. Indeed, he
explicitly rejects the logic of ‘the end of history’, one that believes that the collapse of
state Marxisms and Marxism’s theoretical fatigue “which turned the political into the
expression, or mask, of social relationships” in fact opens up a pathway for politics to
find “its contemplative purity in the principles and forms of a politics itself returned to its
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original purity thanks to the retreat of the social and its ambiguities.”33 The connection
between the political and the social, with all of its ambiguities, is for Rancière an
essential modality for critique. However, when politics is solely limited and contained
within the terrain of the social we essentially empty both fields onto a flat horizon: we are
unable to distinguish between, on the one hand, what pertains to the political and social
proper, and, on the other hand, what is operative within the logic of policing as “the
practices and legitimizations of the consensus system” 34 and the social as “the place
where politics is played out,” a space for where this logic unfolds and falls back on ways
of being with one another.35
While a necessary strategy to re-address liberalism’s failure to actually guarantee its
formal guarantee of an equal, open and tolerant society, it is in this precise sense that the
becoming political of the social and the becoming social of the political essentially forms
a mis-alliance that, to return to Jameson, lobotomizes its own capacity to produce at a
global level anything other than ‘a monotonous repetition of what is already here’. Part of
this problem, however, stems from the manner in which identity has been said to be
constructed and produced by the processes of globalization and the enactment of global
capitalism throughout the past few decades.
In The Parallax View, Slavoj Žižek maintains that global capitalism’s ability to reproduce
its socioeconomic processes has created a ‘worldless’ horizon for globalization, one
which functions regardless of a specific history or tradition. Unlike previous
socioeconomic regimes, he states that global capitalism de-totalizes meaning with the
effect that “(there is no global ‘capitalist-worldview,’ no ‘capitalist civilization’ proper—
the fundamental lesson of globalization is precisely that capitalism can accommodate
itself to all civilizations, from Christian to Hindu and Buddhist); its global dimension can
be formulated only at the level of truth-without-meaning, as the “Real” of the global
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market mechanism.”36 If we place this definition alongside our first mis-alliance, we must
claim that the logic of police aims to maintain the global dimension of truth (the
continuous production of profit for profit’s sake within the world marketplace) in a local
social space by writing out the traumatic effects, or meaning, that this process engenders.
The trickle-down effect from global markets to local policing allows us to identify our
second mis-alliance that Jameson describes as the defining feature of globalization’s
impact on identity: “the becoming cultural of the economic, and the becoming economic
of the cultural.”37
The ‘becomings’ of economics and culture were perhaps best theorized by Zygmunt
Bauman in his now classic work Liquid Modernity. In his view, modernity at the end of
the twentieth century could be understood as a process where economic and cultural
production is, amongst other indicators such as private, atomized, and individuated,
increasingly ‘light and liquid’. In this sense, “a radical change in the arrangement of
human cohabitation and in social conditions” has been enacted based on the increasing
acceleration of economic power to instantaneously rearrange the demands and desires of
cultural consumption.38 The liquid, light, diffuse and network oriented processes of
modernization necessarily subordinate the heavy, solid, condensed and systemic
orientation of politics, as the latter are too slow to do anything other than guarantee the
essential feature of modernity: “needing to become what one is.”39 If we are willing to
push Bauman’s analysis to its logical conclusion, we should claim that any society that
wishes to guarantee the proper production of identity within contemporary global
modernity such that ‘one can become what one is’, necessarily bears the mark of our two
sets of mis-alliances: namely, they must open a uniform horizon within which politics
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always already guarantees a culture that continuously conforms to the actualization of
profit ‘together-with-time-everywhere-just-now’.
But what happens to the supposedly worldless horizonal schema of contemporary global
modernity when profit is not able to be guaranteed? Let us take the occurrence of the
2008 economic collapse as an example. In the wake of this event which has yet to
conclude, we have witnessed a stark inversion of the processes that inform this schema.
In a first instance, economic recovery has been a slow, uneven and precarious venture.40
In a second instance, and perhaps what is even more interesting, is the manner in which
the slow processes of economic revitalization have been accompanied by the rapid and
seemingly ubiquitous emergence of a highly antagonistic form of nationalism thought to
have withered away when the twentieth century prematurely ended in 1989.41 There is a
crucial moment in Žižek’s definition of global capitalism that might allow us to
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understand what is happening here: ‘the fundamental lesson of globalization is precisely
that capitalism can accommodate itself to all civilizations.’ What Žižek misses is that it is
not so much a question of capitalism ‘accommodating’ itself to various ‘civilizations’.
Rather, participation in the global market necessitates the production of local,
individualized meaning within a particular culture that is nonexchangeable and yet
somehow makes reference to the universal truth of the market mechanisms. If there
seems to be something like a worldless horizon within global capitalism, it is only
because the truly global dimension of capitalism arrives in its ability to nullify not only
rural provincialism, but also urban diversity through the logic of policing that
continuously reforms society to the singular demand of the generation of profit. Thus, it
is local, individualized meaning that accommodates itself to global capitalism by tending
towards a surplus national homogeneity. And it is here that we can finally begin to see
how the two couplings between the political and social, and the economic and the
cultural, form sets of mis-alliances proper.
We already briefly examined the deficient mode of thinking and action that results from
the becoming political-social. To restate the underlying dynamic, we could say that this
becoming operates by flattening difference such that the political and the social not only
gain coherence when they are placed alongside one another, but end up becoming
inseparable from one another. Each pole comes to inflect a single function with a singular
meaning that in essence is always already the same: if politics is leveled down to the
logic of police, then society becomes an object whose only function is to be policed,
regulated and rendered into inert passive mass. If we consider this dynamic in terms of
our second set of the becoming economic-cultural, when economics is only operative
within the logic of producing profit for profit’s sake, culture becomes an object from
which profit must be produced: what is ‘cultural’ only makes sense, only becomes
meaningful, as that which generates profit. To claim that these couplings form misalliances is not to play the naïve game of postulating alternative histories, to state that we
should return to some past situation where these configurations differed or, at every turn,
to believe that things could have developed in other ways. Rather, to name the becoming
political of the social and the becoming social of the political, and the becoming
economic of the cultural and becoming cultural of the economic as sets of mis-alliances is
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simply to re-orient ourselves within a framework from which to understand the history of
the present. Moreover, these mis-alliances are not simply a matter of a false
consciousness if by this we only maintain that they have ceded to an ideological illusion
– they are real, they have real effects that come to structure reality and our engagement
with contemporary global modernity.
This is perhaps best explained by Deleuze and Guattari’s Anti-Oedipus, when they write
“false consciousness is the true consciousness of a false movement, the true perception of
an apparently objective movement.”42 If we read this back upon the narrative we have
constructed so far, globalization’s injunction for worldlessness forms an apparently
objective movement within which something like nationalism is not required. Rather,
nationalism is deemed a separate occurrence that corrupts the perfect, natural functioning
of markets in a society whose politics guarantees the continuation of the generation of
profits. But if we are willing to open up our sets of mis-alliances we begin to understand
that the creation of new, local, national ‘worlds’ is always already accomplished by the
act of locally accommodating global capitalism.
Therefore, we claim that contemporary global modernity can only function through a
series of disavowals and displacements that form mis-alliances not only within these two
sets of becoming but between them as well. The violence produced by the ‘real’ of
market mechanisms must be displaced onto all others, including those within their own
space, in order to legitimize the specific political-social configuration of global capitalism
within a particular culture. But when the ‘real’ of market mechanisms becomes intrusive,
which is to say when the truth they generate in the form of the bad infinity of profits fails
to continue, this latent displacement rushes to the foreground. The local national worlds
that were created to support and accommodate market mechanisms are simultaneously
reoriented in an antagonistic way, such that the problem is not local, or global, but
belongs to the other(s) who corrupt their world. In this precise sense, the ubiquitous
emergence of nationalism today must not be read as a symptom, or accidental effect, nor
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even as a syndrome, or collective group of signs that run together; the language of
medico-scientific discourse must be abandoned all together insofar as it would ascribe to
the logic of global capitalism and the process of globalization some ideal, healthy
pathway and normative function that could be returned to. Rather, it is in the language of
identity and morphogenesis, the onto-biological discourse of living, environmentality,
and adaptation that must be evoked in order to describe the mis-alliances of
contemporary global modernity.
As such, I will argue that although the world may be exhausted, worlds violently
proliferate to re-shape and protect the identity of those they deem proper to them. For the
fact that worlds not only form and reform to create a national identity within the
functioning of global capitalism, we need only list a few recent examples: the failure of
Grexit, the success of Brexit and the election of Donald Trump, the emergence of far
right policies and parties in European elections (France, Austria, the Netherlands), as
much as the success of China’s reform process and what has more generally been called
the advent of capitalism with Asian values. What we can glean from such a list is that
‘developing’ and developed nations alike maintain and adapt their local history and
meaning for the sake of securing their place within the specific truth of markets. Thus, we
maintain our guiding hypothesis that given the situation of contemporary global
modernity what is needed is a new framework to describe the relationship between
ontology and politics in order to understand how identity is and how we are in a world
through the co-arising of world and identity.

1.3

Towards a Poietic Structuring of Worlds

A re-examination and reformulation of the concept of world is a crucial first step towards
repairing the relationship between ontology and politics in order to confront the
framework of contemporary global modernity. Such an endeavour cannot be attempted
without first briefly responding to the work of Heidegger. In Being and Time,
Heidegger’s multi-dimensional phenomenal delineation of world as a world (Welt),
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‘world’ (‘Welt’), surrounding world (Umwelt) worldliness (Umweltlichkeit)43 are
inextricably intertwined with the forgotten question of the meaning of being as such and
in general.44 In order to gain access to this question (whose attempt ultimately fails to
come to fruition) he begins with Dasein, a being like the human-being, whose character
of being is such that it has the ability to inquire into its being-there, which is its existence,
for Dasein has always already been thrown into its “here” by being-in-the-world. But
because Dasein is thrown into the world in which it exists, Dasein is necessarily
preoccupied with ensuring its own survival; its engagement with the world is one
primarily of use, in the sense of interacting with beings unlike itself that appear ready at
hand, in order to accomplish projects, for the sake of its own survival. In this precise
sense, the ontic meaning and understanding that Dasein gains of itself is always already
ontologically other to what it is in its being. While we do not have space to outline the
various phenomena that stand out to Dasein and attuned modes of existence within which
Dasein can draw itself out to its-self towards its being, it is enough to note here that the
structures of temporality occupy the privileged role in this procedure. It is time, with its
particular consistency that moves being from the present, back into its past to project a
continuity through to the future that allows Dasein to realize that it is other than its-self,
to draw its-self out to an authentic mode of being-there, here-in-the-world-taking-careof…in-order-to…for-the-the-sake-of-its-self.
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We raise all of this for the following reasons: first, as Deleuze writes in his foreword to
Difference and Repetition, Heidegger’s “more and more pronounced orientation towards
a philosophy of ontological Difference” must be maintained to be the founding moment
of modern and post-modern philosophy and theory alike;45 second, and directly related to
this point, Heidegger continues to serve as an inspiration, if not direct foundation, for
theories of world in relation to globalization and global capitalism that wish to emphasize
their spatial determination.
As Pheng Cheah writes in her recent work What is a World?, “it has also been argued that
contemporary globalization has created a genuinely transcultural zone that undermines
the territorial borders of cultural […] production, thereby leading to the emergence of a
global consciousness.”46 This notion rests between the worldless characterization of
contemporary global modernity that we have previously outlined, and the temporalontological delineation of world we just encountered. In this third view, space comes to
be the predominant determining factor of world insofar as national interdependence on
the global market necessitates a spatial conception of exchange that informs and
cultivates identities. The effect is one that not only minimizes difference but moreover
“conflates the world with the globe and reduces the world to a spatial object produced by
the material processes of globalization.”47 Cheah believes that this incessant movement
towards a spatial conception of world has as its motivation a desire to bury the intrinsic
connection between capitalist accumulation and time. In this regard, she writes that
“capitalist accumulation needs and takes time. […] But capital can neither give itself time
nor destroy it and, moreover, does not want to destroy it. This means that an irreducible
principle of real messianic hope is always structural to capitalist globalization. The
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persistence of time is infrastructural to capital and cannot be destroyed.”48 Her response
to this scenario, then, is to seek in world literature a return to ontological difference, in
the precise sense that it enacts an “opening of worlds by the coming of time, world
literature points to something that will always exceed and disrupt capital.”49 To do so, she
returns to Heidegger via the Post-Heideggerian tradition (and perhaps this return to
Heidegger is only for the sake of this post-tradition) to retrieve and revitalize a concept of
world with its connection to temporality.
Our return to a conceptualization of world will take a different trajectory from these past
and present formulations. The continuous shifting of local values within a supposedly
stable global framework leads to the conclusion that world formation in contemporary
global modernity may best be understood as an form of creation, or poïesis. The modern
instantiation of poïesis also has its roots in Heidegger’s oeuvre, however, and is most
commonly defined as a bringing forth, or an emergence that in a threshold moment forms
an ecstatic movement of becoming.50 Our use of poïesis differs: broadly defined, poïesis
is the unification of thought and action in a particular time and space so as to continue a
world, even though this unification is founded on a becoming-other, a series of
ontological, political, and historical discontinuities without breaks. In this sense, poïesis
is not simply a bringing forth which manifests a self-becoming, a trait common to all
living things. It is rather a continuous re-shaping of that which belongs inside of its-self,
and that which is foreign to it, that which is outside of its-self. Understanding world
formation from the vantage point of poïesis provides us with several advantages to
overcome the current deadlock we have outlined. First, it expresses itself as a dynamic, in
the terms of relationality between the basic coordinates of life (thought, action, time, and
space), such that we do not have to posit a ground to all being or a founding
transcendental principle that comes to structure reality and offers a promise of some
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future to come. We begin, rather, in medias res, with the result that there is no privileging
of either time over space, thought over action, and so on. We have only a continuous
process of closing and constricting as much as an opening and clearing that brings about
a consistency of life, a unity, that always already transforms the static categories of mere
existence (being and beings either as the who or the what) into the relational movements
of living identity (the who or what with… as… against…).51
Second, it is a matter of significance and intrigue that throughout the Western canon
poïesis, and poetry more broadly, have almost de jure been excluded from the terrain of
politics and philosophy alike. Perhaps the example par excellence arrives in the infamous
moment from “Book X” of Plato’s Republic, where the founding of the ideal polis can
only be accomplished by an outright exile of poets from its space. Why the need for this
injunction? Indeed, in his recent work The Age of Poets Alain Badiou goes so far as to
call this an uncharacteristic moment of “subjective complication, the embarrassment, of
this gesture that excludes the poets from the city-state.”52 The answer to this question
may lie in another dialogue, namely, Plato’s Cratylus, whose subtitle is ‘On the
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correctness of names’. Contained here is the argument that language, and names in
particular, should reveal in their very formulation the natural essence of what is being
named in reality.53 Poetry errs insofar as it fails to directly name the essence of the thing
it describes, but rather evokes and conjures other images in the form of imitations,
onomatopoeias, to give meaning to it: as Socrates states, “And may not the same be said
of a king? A king will often be the son of a king, the good son or the noble son of a good
or noble sire; and similarly the offspring of every kind, in the regular course of nature, is
like the parent, and therefore has the same name. Yet the syllables may be disguised until
they appear different to the ignorant person.”54 Thus, the imitative names that the poets
ascribe to life can only generate a reality, to return to The Republic, wherein “pleasure
and pain will be kings in your city instead of law or the thing that everyone has always
believed to be best, namely, reason.”55
If this last discussion of poetry’s exclusion seemed to lead us away from our goal to bring
about a conception of world that places politics and ontology in an equal and reciprocal
relationship, let us here invoke the continuation of Plato’s legacy of names: within
contemporary global modernity we seem to continuously cling to this naming game,
whose diseased remnants fall prey, as Hayden White states, “to the illusion that ‘the order
of things’ could be adequately represented in an ‘order of words,’ if only the right order
of words could be found.”56 As a precise example, let us simply refer once again to our
sets of mis-alliances that ascribe a singular essence and function to a name. In order to
combat this logic, it is imperative that our return to the concept of world does not take the
form of a definite structure where everything has a singular, ready-made place and every
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name a single, ready-made definition. It is rather a process that we seek, something that
could be imagined as a poietic structuring of worlds that continuously relates and relays
the living in a unified way: this unification is always still other than it was, but provides a
continuity through a re-narrativisation of its history.
To this end, let us return to the opening line of Humberto R. Maturana and Francisco J.
Varela’s now classic work Autopoiesis: The Organization of the Living, as it grants us a
pathway to further elaborate how the poietic relates to the world, and to begin to
understand how the world undergoes a structuring along poietic lines: “A universe comes
into being when a space is severed into two. A unity is defined.”57 Why the need for this
second order operation? What is at stake here in this movement from the being of a
universe, the movement of the one out of the two, to a redefinition of the one itself? Is
there a sense in which a unity and a universe come to be at odds with each other? Already
we are confronted with a complex matrix of possibilities that inform the relationship
between a universe, its being within a space and time and then the description of a unity:
in short, we have complicated the relationship between what always already exists ‘out
there’ in space, the event of originary being that brings about the one, and the inscription
not of the event itself but of its arrangement post facto into something other than what it
was. The crucial insight of Maturana and Varela is to distinguish something like a
universe – a divisive turning of the one of being against a space, and into something other
than what it was – from something like a world, a unity that is not simply a container
filled with matter but an organization that dictates the flow of matter such that the
severed space of being temporally becomes one again.
This passage from being-universe to becoming-world may best be explained by way of
Deleuze and Guattari’s Anti-Oedipus, when they elaborate their thoroughly overlooked
concept of miraculation in their discussion of Marx’s insight into the genesis of
capitalism.58 They cite Marx’s statement that capital appears not as the product of labour,
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but rather as the natural or divine presupposition of it: namely, that “machines and agents
cling so closely to capital that their very functioning appears to be miraculated by it.
Everything seems objectively to be produced by capital.”59 Coming from the French term
miraculé(e)s, miraculation has two separate but related meanings: in the first instance, it
is used to describe an individual that has been healed (or cured) from illness by means of
a miracle; in the second instance, it defines an individual who, with exceptional chance,
has been able to avoid a catastrophe. We should note that in its etymology the word
catastrophe has nothing at all to do with some disastrous or cataclysmic event, but rather
denotes a change in position and perspective– ‘I turn, I overturn, I turn away’. ‘Bifo’
sheds light on the potential in retrieving the archaic definition of this term when he writes
that “Catastrophe means, in Greek, a change of position that allows the viewer to see
things that s/he could not see before. Catastrophe opens new spaces of visibility, and
therefore of possibility, but it also demands a change of paradigm.”60
So when the machines and the agents of capitalism (labourers as such) ‘cling so closely
to capital that their very functioning appears to be miraculated by it’, it is evident that the
process of miraculation makes it impossible to create an alternative vision of any kind.
To this end, Deleuze and Guattari write that “as Marx observes, in the beginning
capitalists are necessarily conscious of the opposition between capital and labour, and of
the use of capital as a means of extorting surplus labour. But a perverted, bewitched
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world quickly comes into being, as capital increasingly plays the role of a recording
surface that falls back on (se rabat sur) all of production.”61 If we read this back upon
Maturana and Varela’s statement, we can claim that the capitalist universe comes into
being in the severed space between capital and labour. But in order to conceal capital’s
function of ‘exhorting surplus labor’, a new unity must be defined: the malignant
property of this operation is written out of its functioning, such that the identity produced
within and alongside capital’s worlds can become indistinguishable from the universe of
capital within which they exist. This is precisely why it is not only easier to imagine all
sorts of ‘catastrophic’ events than to implement some change in the fabric of global
capitalism, but also why capitalism itself is all the more content to solicit these
eschatological scenarios: crises occur out there, for instance, again, in the improper local,
political instantiations of nationalism that deviate from the natural and divine functioning
of capital, because capitalism is always already the cure. We either give ourselves over to
the ‘worldless’ horizon of this universe-being, or else our identity is cast out from being
as such.
Without explicitly highlighting the particular procedures of poietic world structuring, we
have already implicated their relational functioning in our foregoing discussion of
Maturana and Varela, and Deleuze and Guattari’s respective work and its relation to
contemporary global modernity. The particular procedures of poietic world structuring
stem directly from these four voices and, as such, they will bear the brunt of our
investigation in this thesis. Before concluding with a final restatement of our discussion
of contemporary global modernity in lieu of these procedures, let us now directly, albeit
briefly, outline these procedures as a means to foreground the presentation in the next
two chapters. First, we have the autopoietic, or universal, self-regulating sphere in control
of its own creation and destruction that, in its self-regulation, appears to objectively
define the global totality of beings; second, the allopoietic, or the convergence between
the demands and values of the universal sphere and its local historical translation which
displaces and represses historical trauma and violence to provide a sense of continuity
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from the past to present and into the future; and third, the poietic-subject, or the process
of subjectivization that allows an individual to gain a sense of their ‘world’, its relation to
the universal sphere, and themselves. The process of subjectivization turns around two
axes, namely, the prosopopoeial and onomatopoeial. The former refers to the manner in
which the creation of a singular, homogeneous, public identity within the allopoietic
procedure comes to stand in for individual difference by forcing individuals to give
themselves over to this identity; the latter refers not to those imitative linguistic processes
evoked in our earlier discussion of Plato’s Cratylus, but rather an immediate process of
naturalization of the singular allopoietic identity within local space such that it always
already appears to have been that way ex novo, from the beginning.
Thus, when the capitalist universe comes into being in the severed space between capital
and labour, it is not yet the autopoietic dimension of a world. It becomes autopoietic
when the malignant property of its operation is written out of its functioning, such that
the circulation and production of capital seems to occur from capital itself, when it comes
to reflect its own divine or natural precondition for all creation and destruction and the
identity produced within capital’s worlds can become indistinguishable from the universe
of capital within which they exist. But this objective, universal functioning of the
capitalist universe can only come about by becoming other than it was, when allopoietic
procedures intervene to support its functioning such that the demands and values of
capital are translated in terms of a local history which naturalize its functioning, an
onomatopoeial process, and are made present within a local space individuating subjects,
a prosopopoeial process. This allopoietic procedure displaces and represses the violence
of the autopoietic coming into being, such that the malignant property of its operation is
written out of its functioning: capital thus no longer confronts labour, but labour is to
always already have sprung out of the precondition capital. And in this way the poieticsubject emerges within the horizon of this universe-being. As the allopoietic procedure
not only legitimizes the autopoietic, but translates it into a local space that comes to
appear universal, the poietic-subject undergoes a prosopopoeial re-arrangement of the
situation which presents itself in onomatopoeial terms of always already having been this
way.
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It is within this process of poietic structuring that ‘a unity is defined’, a unity of
description within which to locate that principle of living which seems to be founded on
and given by common sense as both what is of, from and pertains to the commons and
what is always already experienced in everyday life and language: identity. This
description of the living qua sensus communis only ever seems to come about as
secondary process which attempts to force emergent processes back into the severed
origins of being, thereby canalizing an indivisible remainder in the principle of identity
between autos and allos. Where being is evoked there is always the inherent potential,
possibility or perhaps even necessity to slip back into that fundamental relation of origins
which is produced by the severed space of the universe: being contra nothingness. This
origin, then, returns us to our original question, ‘do we still live in a world’, by
continuously threatening to predicate the self, or autos, on the inverse possibility of a
‘fall’, a loss, a deprivation. As Roberto Esposito maintains in Persons and Things, the
structural coupling of ‘ente’ to and within ‘niente’ inscribes a continuous slippage of
identity from the self of personhood to the thing of otherness.62 This is not merely a
question, then, of alienation from one’s-self or objectification of one’s labour but the total
transformation of the person to ‘das Ding’: a totality of overwhelming indiscernibility
that confronts the fullness of being-autos with the obscene nothingness of being-allos, the
less than nothingness of being other – in short, we appear forced to either give ourselves
over to the ‘worldless’ horizon of this universe-being to ‘become what we are’, or else
our identity is cast out from being as such. By understanding how this fundamentally
poor and forced choice is created through a poietic structuring we open up a pathway to
view our being anew, to understand that how our identity is and how we are in a world
co-arise with one another in a relational becoming.
Neither world nor identity can be reduced to poïesis, however. Simply put, there exist
poetic structures and processes that are not for world, nor for identity. For example,
in The Uprising Berardi connects symbolist poetry with its direct enunciation
of the world without referent to capitalism's processes of financialisation (profit produced
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from profit without ever having to touch the world). He will go so far as to claim that
this process destroys the real world, and presents us with a situation wherein nothing is
created, only destroyed, a claim we will explore in our next chapter in further detail by
examining its relation to capitalism’s ontology of creative destruction and abstraction.
Moreover, in And: Phenomenology of the End, Berardi continues this disjunctive
operation by emphasizing the invisibilization of the world of Semiocapitalism, while
nevertheless continuing to speak about cultural worlds. There seems to be no way within
his rhizomatic phenomenology to bridge the gap, to provide a meaningful articulation of
how a world relates to the world, and how we become together with our world. In short,
Bifo’s position ends up simply repeating the problematic formulation of ‘no world
without capitalism, no capitalism without exhaustion, and no exhaustion without
containment in the globe.’
What is different about a poietic structuring of worlds is the manner in which it comes to
be naturalized for subjects by making the global and specific identity of capitalism
present within local space and history, thereby individuating their-selves. As the coordinates of a world are always in a process of becoming other, identity as well must
become other. It is precisely this constant creation and destruction that global capitalism
generally, and its processes of globalization in particular, tries to conceal in
presenting itself as emptied of history, as a natural order in itself, as a substitute for God
or as a natura naturans. The global and autopoietic dimension of capitalism creates a self
which is discontinuous. It needs to be locally accommodated and provided with meaning
that can seemingly present a continuity of life, identity, and world, that can continue a
world at a local and allopoietic level. It is precisely this point that is missed by current
theorizations of global capitalism and globalization and why our onto-political
investigation of the poietic structuring of worlds is a necessary step to disentangling the
situation of contemporary global modernity.
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2

Autopoiesis, Global Capitalism, and World(s)
2.1

To be rid of the World

Capitalism wants to be rid of the world. To become a universe cut off from the world.
Capitalism desires the globe without the world, circulation without an environment, and
profit without waged or paid labour: global financial capitalism’s wish is to become
frictionless self-creation, to become autopoietic.
There are several ways to understand this global characterization of financial capitalism’s
organization, or, rather, to understand the organizational characteristics of capitalism that
tend towards its self-referential auto-production. In our first chapter, one of these
characteristics was invoked under the name of (real) abstraction, what Marx noted as the
defining trend of capitalism’s relationship to the Real world. To reiterate, real abstraction
was explained as a dual transformation that dissolves the relationship between the
visibility of production and its value for individuals in reality, and, simultaneously, a
process that empties capitalism of determinate historical and cultural content. A second
complementary and supplementary organizational characteristic emerges alongside
abstraction, and it is called creative destruction. Whereas abstraction denotes the
relationship between capitalism and the real world, thereby describing the concrete (or
absent) determinations of the world, creative destruction can be understood as the
dynamic which produces these concrete structural determinations. It is simultaneously
capitalism’s driving force towards the globalizing expansion of its processes of
production (what capitalism consists in), and its reality principle (the constantly changing
global coordinates of what it means to live in a world ‘together-with-time, everywhere,
just-now’).
On the one hand, we must be willing to offer a more complex, nuanced definition of
abstraction than the relationship between the economy and the real world, and to trace out
the history of its effects on the structure of production. This last statement concerning
effects, however, is not to insist on some vulgar Marxist determination of reality as the
translation of base-causes into superstructural-effects. To claim that abstraction produces
effects on the structure of production is to resist, as we shall explore, the facile
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understanding that with abstraction comes nothing but destruction: destruction of ways of
life, destruction of meaning, destruction of a meaningful way of engaging with reality
and a world. It is instead to begin our re-evaluation by taking seriously Žižek’s incisive
observation that what needs to be opposed today is “the simple commonsense [sic]
solution: ‘we have to get rid of the speculators, introduce order there, and real production
will go on’ – the lesson of capitalism is that these ‘unreal’ speculators are real here; if we
remove them the reality of production suffers.”63
On the other hand, if we are to grasp how capitalism wants to become autopoietic,
abstraction’s real effects on reality must be tied to creative destruction. Creative
destruction does not only reveal structural effects on the reality of production, nor a
replacement of one socio-cultural history for that of capitalism. At a more fundamental
level, creative destruction implies an ontological ungrounding of a world, a process of
adaptation that transforms and destroys old structures of existence for the sake of creating
new, faster, more profitable ones. It is at work not only in worlds hitherto untouched by
capitalism but even those made in the image of capitalism itself. Understood together,
abstractive creative destruction thus creates a paradoxical relationship between the world,
capitalism, and worlds: capitalism needs worlds to secure its autopoiesis and conserve the
interior of its organization, but at the same time it wishes to be rid of the world, the
material conditions of an outside which threatens its identity.
In order to illustrate this tension between world, worlds, and capitalism, this chapter will
first explore the organizational characteristics of abstraction and creative destruction. The
work of ‘Bifo’ shall serve as our guide insofar as it operates within a creative theoretical
matrix that emphasizes the thought of Deleuze and Guattari along with Italian autonomist
Marxism—in other words, philosophy and theory together with political economy.
Working through Bifo’s analysis of abstraction will provide us with a historically
grounded reading of capitalism’s development, while also allowing us to situate certain
key terms for Deleuze and Guattari. Second, we shall trace a brief history of the
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relationship between capitalism and the theory of autopoiesis, paying particular attention
to developing three main processes of the latter: structural coupling, operational closure,
and reciprocal causality. The work of Sir Stafford Beer and the late work of Guattari shall
be invoked to provide us with a way to think through the connection between a biological
theory of living and the organization of human socio-political life. Finally, we shall reread abstractive creative destruction through and within the paradigm of autopoiesis,
elaborating how capitalism comes to embody an autopoietic dimension of worlds in the
situation of contemporary global modernity. To this end, the three passive syntheses of
production from Deleuze and Guattari’s machinic ontology, namely, connection,
disjunction, and conjunction, will be explored as a means to update Anti-Oedipus’
concrete articulation of the relationship between capitalism, politics and ontology. Taken
together, the analyses of this chapter will advance the autopoietic dimension of the
poietic structuring of worlds. Capitalism becomes autopoietic by creating a dimension of
global, particular, truth, which simultaneously abstracts from the world and is
accommodated by worlds through means of creative destruction. This will prepare our
analysis of local, allopoietic worlds, which undergo a transformative process to become
structurally non-particular in their accommodation of autopoietic capitalism.

2.2

A Note on Two Trends: Abstraction and Creative
Destruction

In The Uprising, ‘Bifo’ summarizes three historical levels of abstraction that have
occurred throughout the history of capitalism:64 the first level is the separation of a
labourer’s use-value from concrete forms of human activity. This is the particular process
that Marx describes in Capital when he claims that production under capitalism is not
simply producing commodities, but in essence, the production of surplus-value. This
view implies a veritable transformation of material goods into something other and more
than themselves, no longer simply ‘useful’ things but social relations that tend towards
the excess of themselves. To repeat an almost comical example that Marx provides,

64

The following critical discussion draws its general schema from Berardi, The Uprising, 102-104, albeit,
modifying some of the terminology and its articulation.

31

whether one’s labour involves the production of sausages in a sausage factory or the
production of teaching in a ‘teaching factory’ (i.e. a school generally and a university in
particular), the result is the same. The effect of one’s labour is no longer contained by the
production of labour itself, but its abstraction into surplus-value for capital. “The notion
of a productive labourer therefore implies not merely a relation between work and useful
effect, between labourer and product of labour,” Marx writes, “but also a specific, social
relation of production, a relation that has sprung up historically and stamps the labourer
as the direct means of creating surplus-value. To be a productive labourer is, therefore,
not a piece of luck, but a misfortune.”65
The abstraction of labour-production into social relations that create surplus-value
necessarily rests upon certain homogenizing elements: the homogeneity of time as
discrete measurements of productive-labour; the homogeneity of labour as quantifiable
social labour; and the production of labour-value as “abstract, homogeneous labortime.”66 Taken together, it becomes clear that the homogeneous abstraction inherent in
this first level of capitalist production can explain Berardi’s previously quoted remark
that ‘in the Indust-Reality the invisible goal of abstract valorization [the production of
surplus-value] was obtained by physical manipulation of visible things [the
transformation of both labour and commodities into socially homogeneous quantifiable
objects].’67
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A second level of capitalist abstraction arrives in the phase of what Berardi calls latemodern capitalism. Here, ‘Bifo’ insists upon breaking up what is normally referred to as
late capitalism, the period of capitalist development following the Second World War and
continuing up until the present. Implicitly, he argues against placing the emphasis of
capitalism on its material globalizing trajectory, what Ernest Mandel described in 1972 as
“far from representing a ‘post-industrial society,’ late capitalism thus constitutes
generalized universal industrialization for the first time in history.”68 Indeed, to
emphasize the generalized universal industrialization of late capitalism is to remain only
within the first level of abstraction. In this regard, ‘Bifo’ draws attention to precisely
those elements of abstraction which would lead to the characterization of capitalism’s
development towards a post-industrial society. The second phase of abstraction, then,
arrives in the digital abstraction of production where the production and exchange of
information comes to supplant the production and exchange of things. It is no longer
production as such which yields the greatest surplus value. To amend Mandel’s
formulation, it is rather the constitution of the first truly generalized universal markets
which marks this development of capitalist abstraction and which begins to signal its
deterritorialization, the emptying of its qualitative socio-cultural and historical content.
The third level of capitalist abstraction, and that which ‘Bifo’ is most concerned with, is
the financialisation of a universalized market economy where value becomes abstracted
from the production of information and physical goods as such. Here, wealth is directly
able to beget more wealth. This push towards greater abstraction directly stems from the
dissolution of the Bretton-Woods agreements by American President Richard Nixon in
1972, where money was freed from the Gold Standard guarantee.69 Because of this
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‘dereferentialization’ of capital from material guarantee, capital breeds more capital from
itself without ever having to pass through the real, or as Berardi writes “accumulation no
longer passes through the production of goods, but goes straight to its monetary goal,
extracting value from the pure circulation of money, from the virtualization of life and
intelligence.”70 If the result of the first level of capitalist abstraction was, as Marx
claimed, the sheer misfortune of becoming a productive labourer, then the effect of this
third level of abstraction for Berardi is nothing short of utter disaster: the
deterritorialization, dereferentialization of financial capital not only signals the
destruction of the labourer but the world as such.
The Uprising is rhythmically punctuated with a refrain that goes so far as to claim that
through processes of financial abstraction “nothing is created from this destruction”71:
“The destruction of the real world starts from this emancipation of valorization from the
production of useful things, and from the self-replication of value in the financial field.
The emancipation of value from the referent leads to the destruction of the existing
world. This is exactly what is happening under the cover of the so-called financial crisis,
which is not a crisis at all.”72 In these last passages, Berardi appears to be captured by a
dangerous line of theorization. He simultaneously views capitalist abstraction as unreal
in the sense that capitalism no longer creates anything but capital itself thereby becoming
closed off from the world, and too real, insofar as the lack of creating useful things
results in the destruction of both ‘the real world’ and ‘the existing world.’ It is my view
that ‘Bifo’s’ description of the process of abstraction defining the relationship between
capitalism and the world amounts to an aporia. It appears as both detached from the
world and yet continues to immanently effect the world. Despite his careful genealogical
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tracing of the process of abstraction, ‘Bifo’ seems to forget that financial speculation is
but the latest instantiation of this trajectory whose transformation of society always seems
to signal the possibility of its total destruction and dissolution. Even more crucially, and
to expand upon Wolfgang Streeck’s comment from our last chapter, Bifo ultimately
forgets that capitalism always needs societies to guarantee the conditions for its own
possibilities. As such, even the survival of financial capitalism is inextricably bound up
with the force of life manifested by nations, states, societies, communities, and persons.
On this point, commenting on the paradoxical relationship between capitalism’s
transformation of society and the impending automation of production in the 1950’s,
Hannah Arendt prophetically commented that “the modern age has carried with it a
theoretical glorification of labor and has resulted in a factual transformation of the whole
of society into a laboring society. The fulfilment of the wish, therefore, like the fulfilment
of wishes in fairy tales, comes at a moment when it can only be self-defeating. It is a
society of laborers which is about to be liberated from the fetters of labor.”73 If we bring
Arendt’s quotation together with the financialised abstraction of capitalist organization as
described by Berardi, it becomes evident that from a certain point of view capitalism’s
wish to become frictionless self-creation is eminently self-defeating. It is capitalism itself
that has created contradictory conditions for the process of abstraction to smoothly
unfold. But nevertheless, capitalism continuously overcomes the drag of its own deterritorializing contradictions, those destructive tendencies that ‘Bifo’ focuses on: it
continues to create, to reterritorialize itself. To this end, critical theorists, philosophers,
and political economists alike invoke a different moniker to describe its abstractive desire
to expand the borderless existence of globalization and to be rid of the material world,
namely, creative capitalism. Let us (all too) briefly work through a few examples which
form a counterpoint to the narrative we have been working with thus far, before returning
to a final evaluation of Bifo’s position.
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In his critical work The Persistence of the Negative, Benjamin Noys defines creative
capitalism as a form “predicated on invoking the inexhaustible value creating powers of
novelty, production and creativity.”74 Here, creation does not deal with the production of
useful things, a material referent for value, but the production of energy and desire,
immaterial production and labour, production and labour without limits and without
boundaries. Michael Hardt and Antonio Negri expand on this line of thought in the larger
context of globalization with their concept of Empire. “The concept of Empire is
characterized fundamentally by a lack of boundaries” whose processes of globalization
are sustained by “the creative forces of the multitude.”75 Much like our description of the
contradictory conditions brought about through abstraction, for Hardt and Negri the
creative energy which sustains the logic of Empire carries with it the possibility of
negation and destruction, of liberation from capitalism itself. In this regard, the
relationship between Empire, the political, economic and ontological fabric of global
capitalism,76 and the multitude, namely, the anonymous mass subjectivity constituted
within capitalism’s structuring, is one constitutive of an antagonism generating positive
creativity: “the deterritorializing power of the multitude is the productive force that
sustains Empire and at the same time the force that calls for and makes necessary its
destruction.” 77 In a different register, Streeck provides a third notion of creative
capitalism, tying together Noys, Hardt and Negri’s lines of thought. He explains that
“rather than restoring the protective limits to commodification that were rendered
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obsolete by globalization,” what could be captured by the antagonism between the
creative potential of the multitude and the untiring energy of their creative labour, “ever
new ways will be sought to exploit nature, extend and intensify working time, and
encourage what the jargon calls creative finance, in a desperate effort to keep profits up
and capital accumulation going.”78
What ‘Bifo’ misses, then, is that financialised abstraction is not only real in the sense that
Žižek describes, as necessarily producing effects upon the structure of social and
economic production—in a more fundamental way, this organizational characteristic of
capitalism always already creates a particular ontological texture in its destruction of an
existing world, a world as it once was, even a world that has been made in the image of
capitalism itself. It is precisely owing to the ontological necessity inscribed in this
operation that the relationship of labour to, and the transformation of society within, the
processes of capitalism’s abstraction differ from more traditional notions of alienation
understood as either estrangement or expropriation. Abstraction supplants the
expropriation of waged-labour in order to overcome its drag on the production of surplusvalue. It transforms the soul of societies, the principle of life which predicates survival on
the estrangement of the individual from the collective by implicating the survival of
societies themselves within the success of capitalism’s self-referential processes of
abstraction. Therefore, having transformed all of society into a labouring society, global
financial capitalism cannot simply create. To create, it first must destroy labour,
environments, and finally, worlds, even as it relies on these very structures for its
existence. As Alain Badiou reminds us, “the opening of a space of creation requires
destruction.”79 Badiou raises this point in his Logics of Worlds as a means to explain the
manner in which an event comes to disrupt a world. He views this creative potential as a
means to counteract the totalizing hegemony of global capitalism, for the truth unleashed
by the site of events to free us from the effects of capitalist doxa on the (political)
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world.80 In light of our forgoing presentation, however, we should instead argue that with
these last formulations we have been witness to the emergence of a second organizational
characteristic that supplements abstraction and facilitates capitalism’s tendency towards
its own self-referential auto-production: namely, creative destruction.
The notion of creative destruction was popularized by Joseph Schumpeter in his 1945
work Capitalism, Socialism and Democracy to describe a dynamic view of capitalism.81
From this dynamism, Schumpeter intends to elaborate the reality principle of capitalism,
as he (like Marx with abstraction) believed creative destruction to be the defining trend of
capitalism’s relation to itself, and to the world. In a sober statement, Schumpeter writes
that “Capitalist reality is first and last a process of change.”82 Creative destruction, then,
was meant to elucidate this constant dynamism in general, and capitalism’s drive towards
innovation in particular, marking its discontent with structural stability, stasis and the
sedimentation of monopolistic corporations. It is worth quoting Schumpeter’s definition
of the concept at length in order to explicitly involve its function within our discussion of
abstraction:
The fundamental impulse that sets and keeps the capitalist engine in
motion comes from the new consumers’ goods, the new methods of
production or transportation, the new markets, the new forms of industrial
organization that capitalist enterprise creates. […] The opening up of new
markets, foreign or domestic, and the organizational development from the
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craft shop and factory to such concerns as U.S. Steel illustrate the same
process of industrial mutation—if I may use that biological term—that
incessantly revolutionizes the economic structure from within, incessantly
destroying the old one, incessantly creating a new one. This process of
Creative Destruction is the essential fact about capitalism. It is what
capitalism consists in and what every capitalist concern has got to live
in.83
Whereas real abstraction forms a sort of ‘open secret of capitalism’, something it
acknowledges but whose negative effects and consequences are nevertheless rebranded
under the banners of positive freedoms (precarity and risk), and purchasing power
generating individual accumulation (readily available debt),84 it is interesting to note that
the notion of creative destruction is openly embraced as a positive rhythm of capitalist
production.85 In this sense, abstraction can be understood primarily as the organizing
principle of structural content, the particular manner in which the production of profit and
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surplus value are guaranteed, and creative destruction quintessentially a question of
form(ing), an organizational process generating forms. If we think of the abstraction
inherent to industrialization, the processes of creative destruction that Schumpeter was
describing, this last statement makes concrete sense: the creation of a form to live in the
abstractive reality of capitalism that destroys old ways of life; the mutation of this form to
generate the content of abstraction (the shift from craft shop to the factory to the US steel
industry); the opening up (or creation) of new markets as the burgeoning global
expansion of this form. To grasp the essential fact about capitalism, then, abstraction
must be thought together with the notion of creative destruction in economic as well as
ontological terms.
What does this mean for a world, then, as it exists in the situation of
contemporary global modernity, where abstractive creative destruction no longer
primarily involves bringing capitalism into reality but attempts to set it apart from the
world, to have capitalism become reality as such by becoming frictionless self-creation?
In a first instance, it requires denouncing the view that abstraction is occlusion. ‘Real’
reality is not somehow masked by abstractions which empty particular historical and
socio-cultural forms and thereby estranging individuals from themselves. Abstraction is
not simply a question of invisibilization as ‘Bifo’ claims. Invisibilization may be
paramount to abstraction, if it is understood as rendering invisible capitalism’s reliance
on societies and their forces of life, but abstraction itself is not equivalent to
invisibilization. Rather, as what is at stake in capitalism is still a particular way of living,
capitalism also necessarily requires a specific ontological texture to make life visible, a
speculative framework that makes it present. To this end, in Anti-Oedipus Deleuze and
Guattari provide us with a powerful conceptual toolbox for thinking the abstractive
creative destruction of capitalism with their characterization of capitalism as an axiomatic
and their de-/re-territorialisation couplet.
Understanding capitalism as an axiomatic is first, along Schumpeterian lines, to claim
that it is dynamic and always in a process of incompletion. In order to replace the
qualitative codes of historical and socio-cultural content for the quantitative content of
surplus-value, capitalism must de-code, abstract, and destroy its links to fixed territories.
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Capitalism must deterritorialize itself. But this is an intolerable process, a process of
misfortune that cannot contain the entirety of the socio-political and historical field. Thus,
and not to belabour the point, what ‘Bifo’ misunderstands in his reformulation of Deleuze
and Guattari is that capitalism is not simply a spectral process of deterritorialization. With
every movement of abstractive destruction is another movement of abstractive creation, a
re-coding of persons, individuals and things defined now by their abstract quantities (the
value of their productive labour-time, their exchange value, and so on.) What is re-coded
is the structural dimension of a local world, its ontological, political, social and cultural
forms which emerge through creative destruction to support and make present the
organizing principle of abstraction. Capitalism thus reterritorializes by means of restoring
“all sorts of residual and artificial, imaginary, or symbolic territorialities.”86 To this end,
“everything returns or recurs,” as Deleuze and Guattari write: “States, nations, families.
That is what makes the ideology of capitalism ‘a motley painting of everything that has
ever been believed.’ The real is not impossible; it is simply more and more artificial. […]
There is the twofold movement of decoding or deterritorializing flows on the one hand,
and their violent and artificial reterritorialization on the other.”87
Despite the power of these tools to describe the de-/re-territorializing movements
of financial capital’s abstractive creative destruction, they nevertheless fall short in
articulating the manner in which capitalism relates to a world in the situation of
contemporary global modernity. As Noys writes “although the couplet de- /reterritorialisation provides perhaps one of the most powerful means for grasping the new
articulation of capitalism [as financial abstraction], the conception of such a ‘structure’ as
positive neglects the ‘creative destruction’ of capital, which operates by a ‘negation of
negation’ that captures and integrates elements into new positivities of accumulation.”88
As such, if Berardi is at fault for over-emphasizing the negative consequences of
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financial deterritorialization in his deployment of the concept, according to Noys,
Deleuze and Guattari overly-positivize the process, where “this positivisation of the
economy gives capitalism a ‘full’ reality.”89 Although we forcefully disagree with Noys
that Deleuze and Guattari neglect the ‘creative destruction’ of capitalism, his point
concerning capitalism qua full reality is well placed.
While the machinic ontology of Anti-Oedipus is describing capitalism’s burgeoning
process of financial abstraction, it is as if it remains too closely aligned to Schumpeter’s
analysis of creative destruction whose referent was industrialization. This is to say, it
remains trapped within the biological paradigm of mutation wherein changes to an
organism have no immediate consequence on the environment in which they exist. Put
differently, they theorize a situation where one’s only option is to enact a ligne de fuite, a
line of escape as it is translated in the English version of Anti-Oedipus rather than flight,
or an image of capitalism closed off from the world.90 It is from this point that I will
propose an alternate way of conceptualizing capitalism’s drive towards becoming
frictionless self-creation through abstractive creative destruction, and thereby
understanding its relationship to worlds under these conditions. As I show in the coming
sections, if Deleuze and Guattari’s work is to continue to provide us with the means to
theorize capitalism’s necessary relationship to and reliance on worlds in its organizational
processes of abstractive creative destruction, then we must be willing to think de-/reterritorialisation otherwise: namely, alongside the biological theory of autopoiesis. To
this end, we must re-affirm the descriptive and critical potency respectively produced by
Deleuze and Guattari’s and Maturana and Varela’s machinic ontologies, and implicate
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their correlative potential for grasping how the global dimension of a world emerges
through capitalism in the situation of contemporary global modernity.

2.3

A Brief History of Conceptual Difficulty: (Human)
Life and Autopoiesis

At the point of intersection between theorizations of capitalism and the theory of
autopoiesis lies a conceptual difficulty, an uncertainty of perspective: to what extent can a
general biological organization of the living be implicated in the domain of human life?
This is an issue that is raised by the originators of the concept of autopoiesis
themselves.91 And while Maturana and Varela gesture towards certain social and ethical
implications of their theory at the very end of their “Autopoiesis and the Organization of
the Living,” they abruptly curtail their discussion. Maturana and Varela remain safely in
the domain of epistemology to address the potentially perilous consequences of applying
biological functions to human socio-cultural systems, and do so in order to distance their
theory from others that claim to collapse the nature-culture distinction into a mere
application of ‘nature’ unto culture. 92 What does appear, then, could be called an
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as the perduring historical entity maintained through the dispensability of transient individuals) seemed to
provide a biological (scientific) justification for its economic and social structure. […] Thus, from the
Darwinian perspective it seemed that the role of the individual was to contribute to the perpetuation of the
species, and that all that one had to do for the well-being of mankind was to let the natural phenomena
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Introduction to the Non-Dispensability of Life, or, how not to apply a biological theory to
social life.93 While a detailed examination of their critical remarks remains outside the
scope of our present analysis, it is within this space that their discussion opens up that we
may begin to see the fruitful potential for our analysis of autopoiesis, capitalism, and
worlds.
But what is autopoiesis? To repeat the definition from our Preface, autopoiesis defines
living systems as machines whose dynamic relations constitute a unity in space and allow
for the maintenance of their identity through time. Its conceptual innovation in this regard
is to differentiate the relational independence of the organization of a machine from its
structural components: “the relations that define a machine as a unity, and determine the
dynamics of interactions and transformations which it may undergo as such a unity,
constitute the organization of the machine. The actual relations which hold among the
components which integrate a concrete machine in a given space, constitute its
structure.”94 Machines in this regard may be defined as the invariant features of living
systems: namely, unities that are constituted by the actual relations of its components
connecting it to a space (structure) but whose identity is not reducible to these relations
insofar as the specific functioning of components is generated by the unity of the machine
itself (organization). Although autopoietic machines are generally described as a closed
system of relations whose identity and unity depend on this closure, they nevertheless
remain open to, act on, and are acted on by the outside. Looking ahead for a moment, this
is what Maturana and Varela respectively describe as the operational closure and
structural coupling of autopoietic machines. Thus, autopoiesis is as much a description of
a living system, detailing the relative independence of its organization from its structure,
as it is the procedure by which a living system comes to be a unity, the interdependence
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of the organization and structure self-separating from their background,95 and wherein its
identity co-arises with the bringing forth of a world.96 To this end, what we must avoid
by avowing a connection between capitalism and autopoiesis is the application of yet
another metaphor to explain its organizational characteristics, to re-inscribe its
functioning within a biological framework so as to ‘naturalize’ it and thereby explain
away its transcendental hold on the (seemingly absent) world. Instead, I claim that
capitalism must be thought of as a real machine whose relationship to the world and
reliance on socio-cultural worlds is explicitly autopoietic. Thus, before moving onto our
proper analysis of autopoiesis, capitalism, and worlds, it is necessary to trace a short
history of how the theory of autopoiesis has been taken up in relation to the domain of
human life. This will not only clarify our own position, but serve to strengthen the
legitimacy of its operation.
The connection between capitalism and autopoiesis has, in a certain sense, been present
since its introduction to the English language community. When “Autopoiesis and the
Organization of the Living” was first published in English, it contained a preface by Sir
Stafford Beer. He was a prominent theorist of cybernetics who worked closely in the
early 1970s with the visionary Cybersyn project.97 Predisposed by his background, as
Beer puts it, he seizes upon Maturana and Varela’s silence with regard to the social and
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ethical implications of their work to advance his own understanding of the relation
between society and autopoiesis, claiming that above all else, social systems are
biological systems. He writes “that any cohesive social institution is an autopoietic
system. […] In the first place it means that every social institution (in several of which
any one individual is embedded at the intersect) is embedded in a larger social institution,
and so on recursively — and that all of them are autopoietic.”98 Thus, Beer claims that
everything which exists as a social system, and thus all of human life, is autopoietic. But
Beer moves one step further, pushing his analysis of autopoiesis and human life into the
domain of politics. Any country, institution, family, or individual, autopoietic as they
may be, become limited in their potential for change insofar as each is caught up in a
recursive relationship with a larger autopoietic system. Ultimately, what this entails is
that no autopoietic social system can escape the eminent hold of capitalism: “A country
attempting to become a socialist state cannot fully become socialist; because there exists
an international autopoietic capitalism in which it is embedded, by which the
revolutionary country is deemed allopoietic.”99 From a socio-political standpoint, Beer’s
conclusion that capitalism represents the recursive limits of an international autopoietic
machine is a crucial movement in the right direction. However, in a strange way his
initial premise regarding the ubiquitous emergence of autopoietic socio-political
organizations, from the individual to the nation-state, is suspect at best.
From a biological perspective, to claim that ‘everything which exists is autopoietic’ is
sound where existence is tied to notions of living qua autonomy. Certainly, Maturana and
Varela’s theory is only meant to provide a concrete means “to understand the
organization of living systems in relation to their unitary character,” which is to say how
individual, autonomous organizations maintain their autonomy as living machines.100 In
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this sense, to not possess a unitary character of autonomy is not to be alive. Early on in
their work, Maturana and Varela are also clear that the organization of an autopoietic
machine may contain other structural autopoietic components. The human body, for
instance, is an autopoietic organization (once it comes into existence it works towards
maintaining and producing its own self-existence) containing an immune system that is
also autopoietic in itself. From this perspective, Beer’s assertions regarding the recursive
network of autopoietic machines comprising social systems appears unassailable.
As Beer himself points out, however, Maturana and Varela clarify and nuance these
points. Indeed, they write that “we may treat autopoietic systems as if they were not
autopoietic (that is, they are allopoietic) when the boundaries of the system are
enlarged.”101 In this sense, by enlarging the boundaries from the individual to the
international organization of capitalism in the recursion that Beer traces, does he not miss
the manner in which this movement transforms these smaller autopoietic social systems
into allopoietic ones, that is, machines which produce something other than themselves?
That it is not only countries, institutions, families, or individuals attempting to effectuate
a line of escape away from capitalism that become allopoietic, but that their very
relationship to these larger social systems is already allopoietic? That, as our analysis of
abstraction demonstrated, the survival of their identity already depends on producing
something other than themselves? Varela provides an interesting point of clarification for
this discussion of boundaries in a later essay, wherein he raises the notion of global and
local levels in the production of autopoietic organizations. Here, he insists on a dynamic
of reciprocal causality to define the operation and observation of autopoietic machines
that moves between “local rules of interactions (i.e. the components’ rules, which are
akin to chemical interactions) and the global properties of the entity (its topological
demarcation affecting diffusion and creating local conditions for reaction).”102 In this
precise sense, then, to enlarge the boundaries of an autopoietic organization whereby it
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may be considered allopoietic is not simply a question of observational perspective, but
more fundamentally an ontological problem for its definition insofar as a change at the
global level of its organization immanently effects the local rules of its structural
interactions.103 The same local processes and interactions may be occurring, but what
they are occurring for, with and against, whether they can be maintained as becoming
auto or allopoietic, changes depending the global dimension creating their conditions of
possibility and interaction. To become autopoietic, then, is never guaranteed — it is only
a possibility in the domain of human life.
Thus, to claim that ‘everything which exists is autopoietic’ raises a particular series of
problems when considered from an ontological and socio-political perspective in general,
and Deleuze and Guattari’s machinic ontology in particular. First, is a problem of
connection, or, to what extent does the interaction, combination, and transformation of
autopoietic machines effect the production of their autopoietic status? Second, a problem
of disjunction, or, how can certain autopoietic organizations become dominant over
others, whose production can be said to determine the production of other autopoietic
organizations without those other autopoietic organizations losing their autonomy? Third,
a problem of conjunction, or, how can diverse collective or individual identities be
consummated under these conditions where, again, everything is autonomous, where
connection to an outside is necessary but the interior autopoietic organization attempts to
preserve itself, to defend itself from the outside? Finally, how can the co-arising of
identity and a shared world be explained from this perspective without recourse to an a
priori transcendental subjectivity?104 Answering these questions will be integral to our
theorization of capitalism as an autopoietic machine in the next section of this chapter,
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and our understanding of how this autopoietic procedure effects the onto-political
structuring of worlds in the situation of contemporary global modernity. Although Beer’s
preface to Maturana and Varela’s work cannot and is not meant to satisfy these problems,
it is this line of questioning that Guattari attempts to take up in his last book,
Chaosmosis: An Ethico-aesthetic Paradigm.
Guattari’s analysis of autopoiesis occurs from the strict vantage point of re-interpretation,
of rethinking its potential from the perspective of identity and difference, subjectivity and
alterity. His primary concern is to extend its description not only to human life or social
systems, but technical regimes as well, to the domain of human-made machines in their
interactions with humans. As such, he sees in autopoiesis the machinic operation of
liberating subjectivities through their relation to alterity: “we are not confronted with a
subjectivity given as in-itself, but with processes of the realisation of autonomy, or of
autopoiesis (in a somewhat different sense from the one Francisco Varela gives this
term).”105 The autopoiesis of social systems is not a given, then, as it was for Beer, but
emerges through a process of becoming. Gary Genosko provides a concise reading of the
implications of Guattari’s understanding of autopoiesis when he writes that “Guattari’s
concern is not self-realization through widening of a pre-given self, but processes of
singularization that resist the frames of reference imposed by an identity (a processcollapsing circumscription) yet bear upon everything concerning the way one lives, feels,
thinks, and acts.”106 In Guattari’s view an autopoietic machine is not solely defined in
positive terms, by the survival of its identity, but is rather implicated in a dialectic of
finitude with the other. Autopoiesis is therefore equally constituted through a breakdown
of its operational closure (the interior, self-separating organization of its-self) and its
structural coupling with alterity (its connection to the outside). 107
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In this regard, quickly delineating and critiquing Maturana and Varela’s biological
distinction between allo- and auto-poietic machines, Guattari brings alterity back into the
functioning of autopoietic machines themselves:
But autopoiesis, which uniquely defines autonomous entities – unitary,
individuated and closed to input/output relationships – lacks
characteristics essential to living organisms, like the fact that they are
born, die and survive through genetic phylums. Autopoiesis deserves to be
rethought in terms of evolutionary, collective entities, which maintain
diverse types of relations of alterity, rather than being implacably closed in
on themselves. In such a case, institutions and technical machines appear
to be allopoietic, but when one considers them in the context of the
machinic assemblages they constitute with human beings, they become
ipso facto autopoietic.108
‘They become ipso facto autopoietic’: in this last passage, then, Guattari is willing to take
the logic of Beer’s problematic claim that ‘everything which exists is autopoietic’ to the
end, but in so doing he not only obliterates any functional difference between
allo/autopoietic machines, but more importantly erases the significance of autopoiesis
itself. Thus, in a first instance, the move to collapse the distinction between
auto/allopoietic machines is understandable, insofar as ‘processes of the realisation of
autonomy’ entail a shared autopoiesis, wherein autonomy is not reserved for a self but
shared with, for, and as the other. But what does this mean for the self and other as such?
Indeed for all of Guattari’s emphasis on alterity and the reworking of subjectivity which
is not a given in-itself but a becoming-self-with-others (or as he puts it later, ‘a being-forthe-other’), he nevertheless ends up flattening difference when he collapses the
distinction between auto and allopoietic machines.109 Is there not a sense, then, in which
this realization of autonomy ends up transforming both the self and other to the extent
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that alterity and difference becomes meaningless, that it is all subsumed within one big
machine?
This leads to a second and perhaps even more crucial problem in Guattari’s allencompassing formulation of autopoiesis. Guattari seems to misunderstand that
operational closure does not entail that autopoietic machines are ‘implacably closed on
themselves’ according to a pre-given self and closed off from input/output relations.
Genosko attempts to clarify Guattari’s objection to Maturana and Varela on this point,
writing that Guattari “does not misunderstand Maturana and Varela’s idea of ‘operational
closure’ […] but objects to their recursive definition of environmental perturbations
because they entail that encounters with alterity may destroy the machinic or are
impossible.”110 We can think of Jacques Derrida’s delineation of the autoimmunity of
democracy to help clarify this deadlock of interpretation. In Rogues, he writes that there
is an “an autoimmune necessity inscribed right onto [à même] democracy, right onto the
concept of a democracy without concept, a democracy devoid of sameness and
ipseity.”111 By claiming that democracy is inscribed with an autoimmune necessity,
Derrida is signalling the tension between an openness to the outside and the need for this
openness to remain minimized, for the inside to protect itself from the outside while
simultaneously compromising “its own forces of self-affirmation so as to become open
and vulnerable to its outside,” as Michael Naas comments.112 Returning to Guattari’s
dissatisfaction regarding the operational closure of autopoiesis, the point we take from
this discussion is that autopoietic machines are not implacably closed in on themselves.
Rather autopoietic machines necessarily remain open to the outside through their
processes of structural coupling, and this openness constantly threatens the autopoietic
status of the machine.
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In a difficult but illuminating passage related to structural coupling, Maturana and Varela
comment on composite autopoietic unities, or autopoietic machines formed by enlarging
their connections to their environment and subsuming them within their organization:
“Such a composite system will necessarily be defined as a unity by the coupling relations
of its component autopoietic systems in a space that the nature of the coupling specifies,
and will remain as a unity as long as the component systems retain their autopoiesis,
which allows them to enter into those coupling relations.”113 Here is the hard kernel of
autopoietic organization: it must be retained by, through, and with its connection to its
environment. There must be difference in order for it to exist, to have something to selfseparate from, and this difference necessarily threatens its autopoietic status. If we were
to accept Guattari’s flattening of difference between autos and allos and his rejection of
operational closure the ultimate result is a flat machinic ontology, a smooth space of
indetermination where the becoming of a self with and for the other is meaningless
insofar as they inhabit one big machine: a world without outside.
And yet, in an article entitled “The World without Outside”, Andreas PhilippopoulosMihalopoulous repeats Guattari’s insistence on autopoietic alterity as a potential of an
autopoietic organization, though he relates it in this particular essay to the field of legal
theory and spatial justice.114 In a particularly telling passage, he writes that “the creation
of world, of a world (a multiple world, a flurry of worlding) that is nothing but the
furthering of the world; the act of making world out of world, of constant unfolding of
the world. Worlding has no negativity, it finds itself in no dialectical composition, it faces
no otherness. […] Worlding proliferates the world by folding body into body and space
into space, without gaps or voids, yet being ‘opened up by’ the radical outside, which in
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its turn can only be inside.”115 Much like Guattari, Philippopoulos-Mihalopoulous views
this folding of the outside inside, replacement of a world for worlds for the world, to have
a positive effect for subjectivity in general, and justice in particular. It is redemptive and
unifies autos with allos. But, to re-iterate our critique of Beer, what both Guattari and
Philippopoulos-Mihalopoulous miss is that this unification towards alterity, or positive
inclusivity, is only a possibility, and one whose completion can potentially nullify the
autonomous identity of autopoiesis as such. What they obscure is the force of negation
inherent in autopoiesis, its structural transformation and destruction of components based
on inputs from the outside for the sake of producing a coherent organization inside. When
this dimension is taken into account, the collapse of difference in Guattari and folding of
the world in Philippopoulos-Mihalopoulous end up signalling a process that is much
closer to the colonization of daily life, identity, institutions, and machinic ontology: it is a
vision of an all-consuming autopoiesis that wishes to become pure-creation. The positive
and negative, creative and destructive possibilities of autopoiesis cannot be extricated
from one another at either the ontological or operational level. As Maturana and Varela
write, “the being and doing of an autopoietic unity are inseparable, and this is their
specific mode of organization.”116
In light of the foregoing analysis let us reiterate and expand our claim regarding the
relationship between capitalism and autopoiesis with which it began: in the situation of
contemporary global modernity, capitalism must be thought of as a real autopoietic
machine, one whose global organization tends toward the local creation, transformation
and destruction of components to produce its-self and worlds. Under these circumstances
to describe capitalism as an autopoietic machine is not a perversion or co-opting of
autopoiesis as Guattari claims towards the end of his discussion, calling capitalism the
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“vertiginous collapse in the black hole of the aleatory.”117 Capitalism does not destroy
the potential for alterity, but rather through its abstractive functioning controls, mitigates,
and distributes various forms of alterity within the creative-destruction of its local
components. In this regard, social systems, nation-states, institutions, and individuals are
qualitatively transformed into allopoietic machines, insofar as their being and doing no
longer tend towards the organization of their-selves. Rather, they enact an accumulation
of surplus value for the autopoietic machine of capitalism. This is precisely what other
theorizations of autopoietic organizations miss when they wish to extend its description
to human life, or in extreme cases such as Guattari, to technical machines in connection
with human life.
The remainder of this chapter will complete our global examination of capitalism,
autopoiesis, and worlds. We will unite our forgoing discussions of capitalism’s
organizational characteristics with the description and processes of autopoiesis by
addressing the four ontological and political problems that we raised in relation to the
claim that ‘everything which exists is autopoietic’. To address these problems will
require reading Deleuze and Guattari’s syntheses of production within their machinic
ontology together with the organizational and structural characteristics of autopoiesis.
Therefore, we shall bring the first synthesis of production, connection, together with
structural coupling; disjunction, or recording, with abstractive self-separation;
conjunction, or consummation with operational closure; and finally, world and identity
with reciprocal causality, in order to understand capitalism as an autopoietic machine that
creates the global dimension of life through the de-territorialisation of particular
abstraction, and local worlds through the re-territorialisation of non-particular, creativedestruction.
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2.4

Autopoiesis and Global Life: Capitalism and the
Production of World(s)

Autopoiesis, capitalism, and worlds are processes of production. Whereas the first two
produce machines as much as machinic processes, the last is the unification of the
processes of production which arises to sustain those machines. Worlds are immanent to
the existence of machinic assemblages, co-arise with the production of their identity, and
eminently define the reciprocal causality between their particular global organization,
their identity, and the non-particular local interactions producing the organization. Just as
autopoiesis describes a form of autonomous self-production, capitalism can be
understood as a particular autopoietic machine.118 Capitalism is a composite autopoietic
machine whose co-production of world and identity simultaneously relies on connective
structural couplings to local environments, disjunctive self-separation, or transformative
miraculation of those environments, and conjunctive operational closure, abstracting
from those environments to create worlds for the re-production of its global
organizational unity, or identity. In this sense, and to expand on two postulates of the
machinic ontology framing the opening pages of Deleuze and Guattari’s Anti-Oedipus,
“everything is a machine”119 and “everything is production,”120 but not everything is
autopoietic. As Varela maintains, this implies that “we can admit that (i) a system can
have separate local components which [sic] (ii) there is no center or localized self, and
yet the whole behaves as a unit […] as if there was a coordinating agent “virtually”
present at the center.”121 This is why capitalism structurally appears as a diffuse network
in its organization as an autopoietic machine, why it simultaneously appears as worldless
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and an all-encompassing globe that wishes to be rid of the world, or why from any local
situation capitalism appears as a selfless self: “a coherent global pattern […] emerges
through simple local components, appearing to have a central location where none is to
be found, and yet [is] essential as a level of interaction for the behavior of the whole
unity.”122 As such, capitalism cannot produce its-self only through itself at the local
level. This is why it appears devoid of all historical socio-political content yet remains
essential for the interaction of the global unity and requires local worlds to sustain its
organization. Conversely, this is also why socio-political institutions cannot be
considered autopoietic. Their centre would not only be readily apparent at the local level
of the global capitalist organization, but their being and doing would be self-producing:
their production would remain autonomous, auto-immune from the global organization of
capitalism, instead of tending towards the reproduction of the global organization and
being immanently defined by it.
In order to address the rift between the self-less localization of capitalism and its
global organizational identity we should pause for a moment and further explain the
notion of process for Deleuze and Guattari’s and Maturana and Varela’s machinic
ontologies. We can understand the relationship between process, capitalism and
autopoiesis through the two statements, ‘everything is a machine’ and ‘everything is
production.’ Following the advice of Michael Hardt, these statements are comprised of
two distinct, and yet related parts that immediately thrust us into the realm of
ontology.123 The first part of the claim, “everything is…” indicates a certain flatness to
being: it is ‘one’, everywhere the same, and univocal insofar as one being does not stand
out above all others, does not have a greater access to the meaning or question of its
essence. Deleuze and Guattari make the univocity of being explicit when they write that
“Man and nature are not like two terms that oppose each other, for even if they are taken
to be within a relationship of causation, of comprehension or of expression (cause-effect,
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subject-object, etc.), they form one and the same essential reality.” 124 To understand that
within the univocity of being everything is production is to understand that even to speak
of ‘nature’ or ‘humanity’ as though they were static, a priori and opposing principles is to
already make the error of assuming that all of being emanates from some ideal source or
a point of perfection and divides up reality according to these principles: “There is
nothing else now, not man, not nature, nothing but processes that produce the one within
the other and couple machines together. Everywhere there are producing-machines or
desiring-machines, schizophrenic machines, machines which characterize life as such: the
self and non-self, outside and inside, can no longer be spoken of with significance.”125 As
is made clear in the above quotation, machines work on both humanity and nature so that
reality and being can be considered an asubjective process of becoming that does not
culminate in a natural end or human design. Rather, life as such is connection, creation,
disjunction, destruction, transformation and conjunction through which world and
identity co-arise with one another.
Thus, to maintain that everything is production is to understand process neither as “a goal
[n]or end in itself, nor must it be confused as an infinite perpetuation of itself” that would
lead “to some horror of intensification and extremity wherein the soul and the body
ultimately perish.”126 Rather, it is to give unto production what is production proper,
which is to say, the completion of its processes. This is what Maturana and Varela refer
to when they address the homeostatic nature of autopoietic machines. In their structural
coupling to an environment, self-separation from and transformation of that environment
into a world, the variable defining the being and doing of autopoietic machines is the
completion of its own organization.127 But, and to again bring up the question of
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operational closure, this does not mean that autopoietic machines are either implacably
closed in on themselves or somehow immutably, eternally recurring in their exact form.
They not only remain open to the outside, thereby transforming the inside-outside
distinction, but “due to their homeostatic organization autopoietic systems can couple and
constitute a new unity while their individual paths of autopoiesis become reciprocal
sources of specification of each other’s ambience, if their reciprocal deformations do not
overstep their corresponding ranges of tolerance for variation without loss of
autopoiesis.”128 If these last statements appear incompatible with our foregoing
description of capitalism as a process of incompletion, it is only from the local level of its
structural determinations. Just as capitalism is constantly connecting to new
environments and re-creating local components to ensure the global organization of its
identity, namely, the production of surplus-value and profit from capital itself, for
autopoietic machines in their structural coupling to an environment “the coupling remains
invariant” necessary for the survival of the machine and its identity, “while the coupled
systems [autopoietic and environment] undergo structural changes selected through the
coupling and, hence, commensurate with it.”129 Structural coupling and the first synthesis
of production, connection, must be understood together then.
Structural coupling and connective synthesis form the basis for the development of life as
a series of inter-connections between machines which allow for the production of the
processes of production. When this is thought through the purview of capitalism, to be
modern no longer means being inner cogito machines which somehow find themselves
outside in a world, nor trapped in a world with no outside (their own subjectivity). It is
rather an understanding of machines becoming inextricably intertwined with their
environments, producing global organizations with, as, and against local structures. This
is why Guattari was correct to insist on an intrinsic dialectic of finitude for autopoietic
machines. Through structural coupling and the first synthesis of production there exists
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an “opposition here between two uses of the connective synthesis: a global and specific
use,” namely, the organization of a machine, “and a partial and nonspecific use,” or the
local structure of a machine.130 While connection, creation and structural coupling are
necessary for the survival of machines and constitute the local, partial, and non-specific
components of their structure, they nevertheless constantly threaten the existence of the
global, specific organization. As Varela writes, “whence the intriguing paradoxicality
proper to an autonomous identity: the living system must distinguish itself from its
environment, while at the same time maintaining its coupling; this linkage cannot be
detached since it is against this very environment from which the organism arises.”131
Local components not only break down, or need to be re-created with and transformed for
the autopoietic machine to remain as autopoietic. They actively exist in opposition to the
machine, against it as such, in their open connection to both the environment and the
machinic organization. This is why any autopoietic machine must continuously become
autopoietic through its self-separation from its background, or its disjunctive synthesis of
production.
The disjunctive synthesis of production was already addressed in our first chapter
when we invoked Deleuze and Guattari’s concept of miraculation with regard to
capitalism’s process of becoming autopoietic. To repeat, miraculation described the
manner in which the opposition between capital and labour, and the use of capital as a
means of extorting surplus labour, is transformed such that capital comes to represent not
the product of labour but its origin and presupposition. If we re-read this statement
through the connective structural coupling of capitalism, there necessarily exists an
opposition between the generation of capital as the identity of capitalism’s global and
specific organization and the constitution of labour as its local, non-specific structural
components. This is so because initially and for the most part labour is not simply an
economic relation in the strict use of the term, nor even a social one, but drawing on the
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early Marx can be understood as a specific ontological condition of existence.132
Capitalism’s organizational characteristic of abstraction implicates the ontological
dimension of labour within a social relationship, such that existence comes to be tied to
the survival of capitalism as such through the generation of surplus-value and profit. To
repeat an aforementioned quote from Anti-Oedipus, “a perverted, bewitched world
quickly comes into being, as capital increasingly plays the role of a recording surface that
falls back on (se rabat sur) all of production.”133 Therefore, in order to sustain its global
and specific organisation, capitalism must become an autopoietic entity that disjunctively
“self-separates from its background,”134 injecting what Deleuze and Guattari refer to as
an element of anti-production into its operation.
If what we have been describing thus far can be said to involve the creation of the soul of
autopoietic capitalist production in the form of machines connecting to one another to
constitute the global organization of their identity and coupling to their environment to
constitute their local components, then anti-production explicitly involves the body of
production. Anti-production is a necessary stasis of counterinvestment to the constant
connecting, coupling, creation and transformation of machinic-production: this stasis is
what allows for the formation of the unity of an autopoietic machine as distinct from its
environment. In order retain its homeostatic organization, an autopoietic machine
replaces the background of its existence, its environment which it requires for life, with
its-self through disjunction. This is what allows an autopoietic machine to form a unity
which replaces the opposition generated by the connection of its local components to an
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environment, with the abstractive self-separation of its organizational identity from that
environment. Thus, with each phase of abstraction capitalism secures its autopoiesis by
further self-separating its-self from its background: labour becomes transformed and recreated first, by its disjunction from immediate qualitative existence into quantitative
social relations; second, from the production of physical goods into social information;
and finally, from social information into pure economic quantification. “Everything
seems objectively to be produced by capital as quasi cause” as the global organization
which produces its specific autopoietic identity successively moves from the generation
of social relations, to the generation of social information, to the generation of profit from
profit itself.135
The result of abstractive disjunction can be understood along the lines of Arendt’s remark
on the factual transformation of society into a labouring society: in Deleuze and
Guattari’s parlance “machines attach themselves to the body without organs [the
transformation of the environment into the global organization of the autopoietic
machine] as so many points of disjunction […]: no matter which two organs are involved,
the way in which they are attached to the body without organs must be such that all the
disjunctive syntheses between the two amount to the same.”136 With each successive
abstractive disjunction of capitalism from its environment, then, is a process of
conjunction that allows capitalism to maintain its operational closure and secure the
uniform co-arising of its homeostatic global identity, and local identification through
worlds that allow everything to appear as ‘together-with-time-everywhere-just now”.
Given everything that has been said with regard to operational closure throughout this
chapter, we need only briefly expand its understanding in relation to the co-arising of
identity and worlds. As Varela strictly emphasizes, “the qualification ‘operational’
emphasizes that closure is used in its mathematical sense of recursivity, and not in the
sense of closedness or isolation from interaction, which would be, of course,
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nonsense.”137 Thus, each connection and coupling, and self-separating abstractive
disjunction allows for the operational closure of capitalism’s autopoiesis, such that it can
produce a global and specific truth for self-identification, or a “conjunctive synthesis of
consummation in the form of a wonderstruck ‘So that’s what it was!’”138 Operational
closure, in this regard, allows for a point of identification between the global organization
and local components of autopoietic capitalism. In the conjunctive synthesis of
production, capitalism’s self-separation from the physical world comes to form the
recursive limit of contemporary global modernity. From the perspective of this global
organization, operational closure informs financial capitalism’s transmutation of the
physical world, and of historical, socio-political worlds into the globe. To recall, in our
first chapter we defined the financialized globe of capitalism as an ontic container, one
produced by processes of auto-finality that replace its historical and socio-political origin
with its own immanent self-production, with its identity as the production of profit from
profit itself. To turn a passage from A Thousand Plateaus on its head as it were, global
financial capitalism’s operational closure enacts a process wherein each local world must
become an assemblage “that will prolong itself in and conjugate with others, producing
immediately, directly a world in which it is the world that becomes, then one becomeseverybody/everything.”139 But the closure of the globe of financial capital from the world
in general and worlds in particular is not simply unsustainable; factually, which is to say
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operationally, it is impossible. In order for capitalism to maintain its autopoietic identity,
it necessarily requires a relationship of reciprocal causality with its local components.
Nation-states, institutions, communities, families and individuals not only immanently
comprise the environment of global financial capital, which is to say that which runs up
against global financial capitalism’s drive to be pure creation, but eminently defines the
composite relations through which, with which, and as which the global level of financial
capitalism maintains its autopoietic status.
Global financial capitalism’s desire to purely identify its-self through its operational
closure is but an attempt to discursively do away with its connective structural coupling
to the world. To recursively substitute the reciprocal causality of local worlds with a
teleological determination of a quantitative globe. To forcefully replace the friction and
violence of its abstractive creative destruction with its disjunctive, self-separating identity
of frictionless self-creating profits and universal markets. However, global financial
capitalism forms but the recursive limit of the situation of contemporary global
modernity. In this sense, far from unifying the globe as a totality, capitalism’s expansive,
composite autopoiesis generates and proliferates local worlds which co-arise with the
abstractive creative destruction of its identity. To recall Deleuze and Guattari’s
statements concerning de-/re-territorialization, “everything returns or recurs: States,
nations, families. That is what makes the ideology of capitalism ‘a motley painting of
everything that has ever been believed.’ The real is not impossible; it is simply more and
more artificial. […] There is the twofold movement of decoding or deterritorializing
flows on the one hand, and their violent and artificial reterritorialization on the other.”140
In order for it to continuously become autopoietic, in its abstractive transformations,
creations, and destructions capitalism’s violent deterritorialization must be
accommodated by local allopoietic procedures. Worlds must be created, histories
transformed and repeated, and a whole series of becomings must be enacted to support
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capitalism’s global identity and its recursive unification of contemporary global
modernity.
But as Maturana and Varela write, “through this ongoing recursiveness, every world
brought forth necessarily hides its origins.”141 If everything appears as ‘together-withtime-everywhere-just-now’, it is because in the re-territorialisation of states, nations, and
families, the co-arising of local worlds with the global identity of financial capitalism
displaces and represses the historical trauma and violence of capitalism’s de-/reterritorialisation. It does so through the local historical translation of the demands and
values of capitalism’s autopoietic identity. This provides a sense and sign of continuity
from the present to past, and projects possibilities for this continuity into the future. The
continuity inscribed through the allopoietic processes of local worlds comes to replace
the empty origin of capitalism, namely, its ontological processes of abstractive creative
destruction. What results is the full body of a world creating conditions in which a local
identity can ontologically be referred to as a “being for,” politically, a “being together,”
and socially as a “being with.” These re-articulations of local identity allow for the
creation of poietic-subjects, whose understanding of themselves and their world is joined
through reciprocal causality to the global identity of capitalism, a prosopopoeial process
which makes the global identity present in local space and individuates it for local
history. This is accompanied by an onomatopoeial process of naturalization such that
every new allopoietic identity already appears to have been ex novo, from the beginning.
Our third chapter, then, will stage a recovery of the theory of allopoiesis by considering
the relationship between the local level of national identity and poetic subjects, and the
global level of autopoietic capitalism in the poietic structuring of worlds. In this way we
may come to realize “that the world everyone sees is not the world but a world which we
bring forth with others. It compels us to see that the world will be different only if we live
differently.”142
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3

Allopoiesis, Local Worlds, and the Precarious Lives of
Poietic Subjects
3.1

Allopoietic Worlds: The Prosopopoeial and
Onomatopoeial Processes of Poietic Structuring

This final chapter will bring together our previous discussion of autopoietic capitalism
and global life with an examination of local world creation. At stake for our introduction
to this chapter is a theoretical foregrounding of how the poietic structuring of worlds
provides concrete meaning to financial capitalism’s abstract and specific identity. We
seek to unfold how historical and ontological discontinuities brought about through
capitalism’s abstractive creative destruction are locally reinscribed into a continuous
generative narrative, such that a singular relationship between politics and economics,
and thus the political and ontological is produced in and for a world. Ultimately, this will
serve to outline how local worlds allow for the production of poietic subjects whose
identity is non-specific, and yet non-exchangeable with other local worlds or the global
organization itself. In a recent interview Bifo provides a precise example of this process
by considering the form of salaried labour from the purview of gestalt theory. He argues
that “the very form of salary is the creation of a social perception, a social vision, in
which you don’t see that salary is an inessential historical and determinate form of
relations between survival, labour, and social life. […] Salary is a gestalt in the proper
sense,” namely, a form creating other forms. Berardi continues: “If you want to
disentangle the other forms of possibility you need to forget about the gestalt, you have to
cancel the gestalt in your brain […] you have to disentangle the potency of human
activity from the limitation of salaried work.”143 A first step towards disentangling the
prevailing gestalt, the universal form(ing) of autopoietic capitalism, is a thinking of local
worlds and local identity as allopoietic—as machines which become-other and whose
becoming other can be described as non-specific insofar as they tend towards the
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production of forms of existence other than themselves, in order to accommodate the
organization of global financial capitalism’s autopoietic, quantitative, and specific
identity.
As we have seen, the quantitative globe of financial capitalism expresses itself in terms of
universality, as an autopoietic machine whose identity is global and specific, and whose
functioning tends towards material self-completion, or auto-finality. This is achieved
through organizational processes generating forms qua markets, the accumulation of
creative energy, and an ontology of abstractive creative destruction. Although it desires to
become frictionless self-creation, capitalism’s autopoietic identity cannot escape the coarising of local worlds. Individuals, persons, institutions, societies, states, and nations are
all required to support capitalism’s autopoietic becomings and to secure its global and
specific identity. As such, the global and specific identity of autopoietic capitalism does
not fully replace local values in a deterritorializing movement towards absolute
abstraction. Processes of abstractive creative destruction rather require a concrete
articulation in a world for their reproduction. The universality and coherence of
capitalism’s expansive autopoietic organization depends upon its successful reterritorialisation within local space and history. As Judith Butler reminds us, the very
notion of universality “is what pertains to every person, but it is not everything that
pertains to every person. […] The abstract requirement of universality produces a
situation in which universality itself becomes doubled: in the first instance, it is abstract;
in the second, it is concrete.”144
In the situation of contemporary global modernity, we will argue that this doubling from
abstract to concrete universality functions through a poietic structuring to create fullworlds which situate the global in the local and ensure the continuous local production of
the global. This is not a process of abstract substitution, that is, the production of a
frictionless metonymy that replaces the qualities of local life with totalizing quantities of
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financial capitalism’s global and specific identity. Rather, it is a question of local worlds
making the absent and abstract global identity present to them-selves. Through a
prosopopoeial process of connection an individuated, nonspecific local presence of the
global autopoietic organization of capitalism is created. This connective creation requires
a disjunctive mode of representation. Signs and names are enacted within a concrete local
history and space to justify its violent destruction, transformation, and re-creation
according to the global and specific, albeit, incomplete logic of capital. New structural
relations are produced to hold local components (States, nations, institutions, societies,
persons, and individuals) together with the global and specific autopoietic organization of
capitalism. But these relations also re-arrange the social, political and ontological codes
of belonging in a world. In order to displace the inherent violence of this reterritorialisation, local history must be re-inscribed within its concrete space so as to
naturalize the poietic structuring of worlds. An onomatopoeial process of conjunction
presents the re-coding and re-inscription of local worlds as having already been as such
ex novo, from the beginning, as new identities and processes of production fall back on
worlds as they once were and inscribe them with a necessity of what they must become:
contemporary, global, and modern.
As such, the co-arising of local worlds and identity in the situation of contemporary
global modernity (re)presents an allopoietic becoming-other which is always contingent.
Worlds and identities are in a continuous and precarious process of structuring. Initially
and for the most part these processes find expression and embodiment through the
necessity of locally and concretely securing the identity produced by the universality of
global autopoietic capitalism. But owing to the prosopopoeial and onomatopoeial, rather
than metonymic, means through which local worlds become allopoietic, they retain some
of their individuality, their personal, social and cultural history. As such, although the
components of local worlds form the structure for capitalism’s autopoietic machinic
organization, they simultaneously form its environment, that which confronts capitalism
and that which capitalism always already attempts to inoculate itself against. This is to
say, local components arise as a structure inside the global capitalist autopoietic machine
to ensure the production of its organization while also forming an environmental
boundary outside of it. As global autopoietic capitalism necessarily functions through
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reciprocal causality between the local and global, and enacts so many structural couplings
to environments, local allopoietic worlds can also disrupt the composite autopoietic unity
of capitalism through their (mis)functioning. This is not to argue, then, that worlds do not
exist prior to their poietic structuring in the situation of contemporary global modernity.
It is rather an attempt to reframe the question of autonomy and identity alongside the
problems of borders and boundaries. We aim to understand that in the poietic structuring
of worlds, local spaces and histories embody contingent, violent, and precarious
dynamics which produce varying levels of inclusion and exclusion in order to ensure that
the experience and identity of everyone and everything exists ‘together-with-timeeverywhere-just-now’ for the sake of generating profit from profit itself. In this sense, the
creation of allopoietic, local and nonspecific meaning to accommodate the abstract,
creative destruction of autopoietic capitalism enacts a fundamentally poor choice: we
either give ourselves over to an allopoietic becoming-other, or else our identity is cast
out from being as such.
Insofar as global financial capitalism needs societies to secure its autopoietic becomings,
the recursive levels of states and nations, the history of nation-states, and the local
production of national worlds shall be emphasized throughout this chapter. Therefore, to
give life to the foregoing theoretical discussion and understand its implications for poietic
subjects, this chapter will explore the allopoietic procedures of local world creation
through the recent history of China’s economic reform process, the political
transformation of its citizenry, and the social destruction of their traditional ways of life.
This choice may appear odd, given the overwhelming emphasis on occidental thinkers
throughout this thesis and the Western nature ascribed to the processes of globalization.
And yet, to paraphrase E.P. Thompson’s description of the industrial revolution, it is
precisely owing to the explicitly Western focus of many accounts of globalization and
global capitalism that the history of its development is no longer advanced as a
description of how we are in a world, but a totalizing explanation of all that is here in the
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globe.145 From this perspective, and to recall a passage from Stafford Beer, it is simply
not the case that “a country attempting to become a socialist state cannot fully become
socialist; because there exists an international autopoietic capitalism in which it is
embedded, by which the revolutionary country is deemed allopoietic.”146 States and
nations involved in the global dimension of the poietic structuring of worlds are already
allopoietic insofar as they produce components which secure the identity of international
autopoietic capitalism by allowing its continuous connection, disjunction, and
conjunction. My wager is that by implicating the radical transformation of China in the
historical vision of the West and the functioning of autopoietic global capitalism, we
may, to borrow from Hannah Arendt, begin to think again about what we are doing and
how we are here in the situation of contemporary global modernity.
Our analysis of China will explicitly focus on the relationship between space and history
in its economic, political, and social reform process. To this end, the normative creation
of a new Chinese national identity that makes the abstract global demands of financial
capital present in local space shall be read alongside the emergence of two new and interrelated urban phenomena: ghost cities and dingzihu, or nail houses. On the one hand,
ghost cities are large urban developments that are erected without a concrete local need
for their production but are constructed in anticipation of and for China’s growing upper
and middle class. On the other hand, nail houses are sites of resistance where individuals
refuse to abandon their homes while their traditional urban district is being demolished
for urban renewal. While ghost cities and nail houses initially appear to present inverse
images of one another – the former being absolutely new while the latter pertaining to the
protection of the old, or tradition – I will claim that as the people inhabiting these spaces
maintain a common status of non-belonging, these two phenomena must be seen as
interconnected. By examining interviews and cinematic representations of urban re-
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construction in China, migrant workers and nail-house protests shall be understood as
respectively embodying the division between the structural function of allopoietic worlds,
the precarity of being inside, and their environmental dimension, the violence of being
forced to exist outside allopoietic worlds. From this perspective, the way ghost cities and
nail houses figure into China’s reform process provides a unique vantage point to
consider the problem of borders and boundaries produced through the formation of
poietic subjects in the situation of contemporary global modernity.
The first section of our chapter will explore the transformation of local life inherent to the
structural function of allopoietic worlds. We shall first examine accelerated
prosopopoeial transformation of urban space in China’s recent economic, political, and
social reform process alongside the eruption of social anxiety concerning the future of its
identity, or the uncertainty of its onomatopoeial process. As such, this transformation will
be conceptualized through a reading of Deleuze and Guattari’s notion of the socius. A
society becomes a socius when its functioning, history and meaning are re-inscribed
according to an organizing principle, such as capital. By providing a secure political
codification for its organizing principle, the re-territorialised formation comes to appear
as the only possible ontological organization of local production, and the organizing
principle of a new socius becomes an a priori, universal condition for life. In this way,
the socius forms a full-body that demarcates clear zones of distinction between all spheres
of life, structurally reforms the private and public, social, cultural, and political, and in so
doing re-inscribes possibilities of inclusion and exclusion. The concept of the socius,
then, allows us to understand how the local allopoietic world of China has re-inscribed
the process of making the global identity of autopoietic capitalism present with positive
social meaning in order to overcome social anxiety, thereby producing new poietic
subjects and subjectivities.
Our second section shall think the re-ordering of inclusion and exclusion produced by
China’s new socius alongside the emergence of ghost cities and migrant workers in
China. In leaving their home to build ghost cities, migrant workers gain access to better
wages but are excluded from participation in the middle or upper-class status of the new
poietic subjects their production is meant to accommodate. Considering how migrant
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workers come to exist on the borders of China’s new socius presents an ideal case to
think through the precarity inherent to the prosopopoeial and onomatopoeial processes
which produce the structural function of allopoietic worlds.
The final section of our chapter will explore the environmental dimension of allopoietic
worlds, examining the violence of exclusion brought about in the re-structuring of local
life. Here, we shall recount two stories of nail-house protests staged at two different
points in China’s reform process. Their differing fates, and the status of nail-house
protests in general, shall once again be examined through Deleuze and Guattari’s notion
of the socius, this time thought together alongside Jean-François Lyotard’s general
theorization of language and specific concept of pagus in The Differend. The pagus
comprises a liminal space, a border zone wherein conflicts over modes of linking, or
connecting ensue in language in general and in narratives in particular. It is here that a
relationship of inclusion and exclusion, demarcating what is inside and outside of a local
world takes place for the sake of auto-identification, or how poietic subjects come to
know themselves and their world through the unification of thought and action in time
and space. Because nail-house protests refuse to give up their homes, they embody a
physical pagus in the Chinese landscape, an environmental disruption in China’s
allopoietic world. Their identity comes to be violently excluded from the life of the
nation, and thus, being as such.

3.2

The Allopoietic Restructuring of Life in China’s
New Socius

From its beginning in the 1980s, China’s reform process has been dominated by the
production of space. This process has emphasized the development of infrastructure and
the (re)construction of cities as a means to re-form its national identity and naturalize the
creation of new markets, modes of production, and social structuring. These statements
may appear odd considering the ubiquity of goods bearing the mark “Made in China.”
Indeed, while the process of (re)development and (re)construction of urban infrastructure
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has been met with awe by some Western observers,147 its relationship to the larger
narrative of globalization predicated on initiating reform through capitalist modes of
production is as contested as the ways to describe China’s particular form of
capitalism.148 In this regard, China’s recent past is simultaneously appropriated as a case
of ‘alternative’ modernity defined by a new potential for political reassertion in the
conditions of depoliticized postmodernity, and as an exception to the rule of globalized
modernity itself where political interference in the natural order of market mechanisms is
seen to constantly threaten China’s future.149 This distinct tendency to (mis)understand
China’s economic reforms as an exception to the rule of global development has resulted
in its casting as the constituent other to Western nations and international organizations.
Originating with Ronald Reagan’s belief that when China opened itself up to the free
market, democracy would necessarily follow, the result of this othering tendency is a
pervasive view that its success could only be guaranteed by the emergence of a local
democratic political system.150 But after the short span of 30 years of reform, by 2008
China’s economic reforms had brought “300 million people from agricultural
backwardness to modernity.”151 Perhaps it is our dependence on, and unease with, cheap
products arriving in the global market from the past so to speak – a place unwilling to
relinquish its allegiance to socialism– that has unconsciously blinded Western academics
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and media outlets alike to the fact that in China the production of space is often
significantly more valuable and transformative than the production of goods.152
Thus, from Deng Xiaoping’s initial policies of “Reform and Openness” in the early
1980’s to today, in China “the production of space, which fosters marketization and
urbanization, is not initiated by a certain mode of production as one expects to ﬁnd in
capitalist countries.”153 Space, rather, has been manipulated and rebuilt to instantiate a
new capitalist economy, a means of making the demands and identity of global
autopoietic capitalism present in local space and naturalized for its society. Wade
Shepard describes the transformation of the Chinese social landscape as a process where
“the old is being replaced with the new, and the new is being replaced with the newer, in
a cyclical process of creation and destruction.”154 From the perspective of global life, this
logic is easily explained by our discussions of autopoietic capitalism’s trend towards
abstractive creative destruction. In this regard, we would argue that rather than forming
an exception to the rule of globalization, China’s reform process provides an archetypal
example of the functioning of local worlds in the situation of contemporary global
modernity: the global and specific identity of autopoietic capitalism has undergone a
prosopopoeial accommodation in space. But for a nation that boasts a continuous
narrative that can be traced back almost 4000 years, contemporary China has effectively
been emptied of all signs of its traditional history.155 From the local perspective of
national history, then, the manner in which this accelerated production of social, political,
and spatial creative destruction has been naturalized in China by its onomatopoeial
process in order to secure a new allopoietic world warrants further exploration.
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In a first instance, we need only briefly consider the histories of Shenzhen, Zhuhai and
the other coastal cities designated as Special Economic Zones (SEZ) by the Chinese
Communist Party (CCP) to understand how this logic has come to dominate the
transformation of the Chinese landscape. In 1978, Deng Xiaoping officially implemented
a policy known as “The Four Modernizations,” namely, modernizations of agriculture,
industry, national defence, and science and technology.156 In order to accelerate the
modernization process, the SEZ were created to mark the beginning of the
aforementioned policies of “Reform and Openness,” what Deng described as “socialist
modernization” at the Twelfth Party Congress in 1982: namely, continuing the “socialist
spiritual civilization” through “opening up” economic development as “the basis for the
solution of our external and internal problems.”157 These previously existing urban
centers were rebuilt and developed in the 1980’s as the first cities to begin trading and
business operations with the global market. They were designed primarily as an
experiment to test the viability of carrying forth market reform and privatization
nationwide.158 In this sense, the urban spaces of the SEZ were re-built to immediately
generate production and wealth, thereby giving physical embodiment to the global
organization and identity of the autopoietic capitalist order within local space. Thus,
reform in China during this period, and the decision to privilege the production of space,
can be directly thought as a prosopopoeial process: the restructuring of urban space was
implemented first, as a means for space to become efficient and rational for the sake of
external connection, of making global autopoietic capitalism present in its local world;
and second, to transform a population traditionally comprised of rural farmers tied to
their land into mobile urban labourers, for the sake of internal conjunction and
identification. While the economic success of the SEZ marked the beginning of a
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sweeping nation-wide prosopopoeial transformation, the naturalization, or onomatopoeial
process of its political and social implications for China’s citizens stuttered.
In a second instance, almost a decade into the economic reforms a rift in China’s social
and political identity began to emerge as a result of the drastic reconstruction of the
country’s urban landscapes and the allopoietic transformation of daily life. Speaking to
the effects of China’s process of becoming-other by transitioning into global markets and
transforming its local population, the dissident journalist Liu Binyan wrote in 1988 that
“the biggest problem we face today in China is not commodity prices or the cost of
living. […] The most serious problem is the wide spread spiritual malaise among people
of all walks of life, a growing mood of depression, even despair, [and] a loss of hope for
the future.”159 To ease the growing tensions amongst Chinese citizenry by attempting to
naturalize China’s prosopopoeial transformation, the late 1980’s witnessed a period of lax
intellectual, cultural and social censorship. It is in this climate that a six-part documentary
entitled Heshang, or River Elegy aired on China Central Television in June and August of
1988. Part five of the film entitled “A New Age” opened with a warning about the cost of
modernization in China: “How many Chinese people are there nowadays who clearly
realize that reform doesn’t just mean […] color TVs, refrigerators and higher salaries[.
…] In its deeper sense, reform is rather a burst of pain in which a civilization is
transformed, a task fraught with danger […] which will require sacrifices from our
generation and even several yet to come.”160 What is described by these two instances
from the late 1980’s is the precarity inherent to the poietic structuring of worlds, namely,
an overwhelming sense of anxiety brought about by the prosopopoeial transformation of
an existing society. To understand how the creation of a new local Chinese world and
identity has been able to transmute this anxiety and effectively displace the pain arising
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from processes of abstractive creative destruction in its allopoietic re-territorialization, let
us turn to Deleuze and Guattari’s notion of the socius.
Throughout the discussions of miraculation in our first chapter, and the disjunctive, selfseparation of autopoietic capitalism from its environment in our second chapter, we have
implicitly been dealing with the formation of the socius and traversing the terrain of what
Deleuze and Guattari call social production. To recall, miraculation describes the process
through which capitalism’s functioning is re-arranged and re-inscribed, ensuring that the
initial antagonism between capital and labour falls back on labourers as such. This is to
say, whereas capital is initially generated through the production of new social relations
whose value is measured by quantifiable labour time, through the processes of
miraculation it is labour and social relations themselves which objectively appear to stem
from capital. Through this miraculating re-inscription, autopoietic capitalism is able to
disjunctively self-separate from its environment to not only secure its identity but further
its organizational processes of abstraction. Disjunctive self-separation allows for the
repetition of its own conditions, such that every point of identification or conjunction
with autopoietic capitalism is the same insofar as it produces a recursive operational
closure moving from the global to the local: “no matter which two organs are involved,
the way in which they are attached to the body without organs must be such that all the
disjunctive syntheses between the two amount to the same.”161 Although Deleuze and
Guattari explicitly reference the body without organs in this last passage, a concept
attached to desiring-production in their machinic ontology, they advance a correlative
concept in the domain of social-production: namely, the full body of the socius.
Through the anti-productive, counter-investment of miraculating disjunction, an
existing society is transformed into a socius. A society becomes a socius when its
functioning, history, and meaning are re-inscribed according to an organizing principle,
such as capital. In this sense, the socius forms a surface where the organizational
processes of autopoietic capitalism are re-arranged into an allopoietic formation. Why is
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this re-inscription necessary? In a general statement concerning their machinic ontology
and the three syntheses of production, Deleuze and Guattari suggest we must realize that
“production is immediately consumption and recording, and this recording and
consumption directly determine production, but do so throughout production itself. Thus,
everything is production: productions of productions, of actions and of passions;
productions of recordings, of distributions and reference points; productions of
consumptions, of sensual pleasures, of anxieties and of anguishes.”162 By delimiting and
distributing the contingent processes of production along its surface, the formation of the
socius acts as a means to quash anxiety and anguish brought about through the
transformation of an existing society.
In this regard, the new structural relations born out of a society’s reformation into a
socius appear as both the only possible ontological organization of production and as a
means to ensure the political codification of its organizing principle (the earth, the tyrant,
and capital, as Deleuze and Guattari state). This entails that the socius, like the body
without organs, represents a universal founding act, a transformation “through which man
ceases to be a biological organism and becomes a full body, an earth, to which his organs
become attached, where they are attracted, repelled, miraculated, following the
requirements of a socius.”163 Contrary to Benjamin Noys’ objection that Deleuze and
Guattari present capitalism as a totalizing and full world, through their theorization of the
socius we can understand that the point is not that capitalism is always already full, or
complete. As Varela explains, world making always arises through “breakdowns in
autopoiesis, be they minor, like changes in concentration of some metabolite, or major,
like disruption of the boundary. Due to the nature of autopoiesis itself […] every
breakdown can be seen as the initiation of an action on what is missing on the part of the
system so that identity might be maintained.”164 Thus, global autopoietic capitalism must
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continuously become complete by incorporating new local environments and destroying,
transforming, and re-creating them in their own image. It necessitates the formation of
new allopoietic worlds that become full by re-organizing structural relations of
production, and capturing the anxiety produced therein.
This is why Deleuze and Guattari cite Marx’s statement that capital appears not as the
product of labour, but its natural or divine presupposition: to repeat, “machines and
agents cling so closely to capital that their very functioning appears to be miraculated by
it. Everything seems objectively to be produced by capital as quasi cause.”165 If this
description is thought back through the narrative of China’s reform process that we have
outlined thus far, we appear to be at a standstill, however. While the prosopopoeial
processes of making autopoietic capitalism present in China function smoothly within our
description of the socius, the coordinates of its onomatopoeial naturalization still remain
at odds with the elevation of capital into a quasi-cause. Indeed, both the Four
Modernizations and the policy of Reform and Openness were predicated on a principle of
socialist modernization. To this end, we further situate the objectivity of capitalism’s
global autopoietic organization and its specific autopoietic identity of ‘capital as quasicase’, in the history of China’s local, allopoietic, and non-specific world creation.
Drawing from Deleuze’s Logic of Sense, we can understand the ‘quasi-cause’ capital as
replacing the continuous geneses of the processes of production with a series of “noncausal correspondences forming a system of echoes, of reprises and resonances, a system
of signs.”166 Though capitalism is not a cause, in a false movement capital is transformed
into a fixed point of origin, the organizing principle of a new socius which becomes an a
priori universal condition for life as such. This is the moment of anti-production proper,
where capital forms a counter-investment, injecting a definite causality to the echoes,
reprises, resonances and thereby constructs its own system of signs out of the new socius.
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Ontologically, everything then seems to be objectively produced by capital in the sense
that the entirety of being and history has led to its development. Politically, this entails
that local history and the relationship between the social, political, cultural, public, and
private spheres of a local world are re-inscribed in the image of capital itself. If we pay
close attention to the opening lines of “A New Age” previously quoted from Heshang,
the imperceptible ontological and political re-codification of China’s society during its
reform process, or the onomatopoeial naturalization of its new socius, becomes clear:
“how many Chinese people are there nowadays who clearly realize that reform doesn’t
just mean […] color TVs, refrigerators and higher salaries. […] In its deeper sense,
reform is rather a burst of pain in which a civilization is transformed.” Communication,
material goods, and the construction of a new system of signs wherein higher salaries
replace traditional society and displace the pain of reform all demonstrate that while
China remained socialist in name, this name would henceforth be submitted to capitalist
economics in command of the nation’s prosopopoeial structuring.167
To conclude this discussion, we must state that Deleuze and Guattari’s description of the
anti-productive element of social production as a socius is revealing. Historically the term
describes autonomous tribes and city-states on the Italian Peninsula who were in
permanent military alliance with the Roman Republic. To this end, the role of socius is
first and foremost one of segregation, of carving up the social field so as to maintain
those who are within the system and outside it—put differently, the socius functions as an
instrument of war to secure an economy, to forcefully ensure the production of a singular
way of dwelling that nevertheless retains a certain degree of autonomy, of history. Thus,
the formation of the socius brings about an allopoietic world that comes to be triply
defined: it is ontologically defined as a becoming towards the production of capital,
politically defined as a codification of becoming together whose identity is shaped by the

167

We are thinking here as well of the displacement of Mao’s ‘politic-in-command’ platform to Deng’s
‘economics in command’. See Li Xing’s “From ‘Politics in Command’ to ‘Economics in Command’: A
Discourse Analysis of China’s Transformation,” in The Copenhagen of Asian Studies, Vol 18, (2003): 6587. Interestingly, Li also notes a transition from Logocentricism to econocentrism in this regard, namely, an
inverted Marxist topography during the Mao era, and a return to the standard Marxist topography during
the Deng period.

79

continuous generation of capital, and socially defined as a being with one another as
labourers, understanding one another through a new capitalist system of signs, such as
salary, commodities, images, text and celebrity. As Deleuze and Guattari write in AntiOedipus, this could be characterized precisely by the recognition that within the capitalist
socius there is truly only one class: “Membership in a class refers to the role in
production or anti-production, to the place of inscription […] and from this viewpoint it
is indeed true that there is only a single class, that class which has an interest in a given
régime.”168 But with this interest in the regime of autopoietic capitalism, we must recall
Deleuze and Guattari’s description of its ideology as a motley painting of everything that
has ever existed. This is why the production of space in China has been so fundamental to
its successful entry into the global economy. China has literally had to inscribe its social
surface with the interests of capitalist production and dwelling, carving its demands into
space to naturalize its functioning within their history.
At this point, then, we must turn our discussion of the socius and its function of creating a
full world for the global level of financial capitalism as the local level of national worlds
towards a thinking of the recent urban phenomena of ghost cities and the category of
migrant labourers. In this way, we may begin to see how the creation of poietic subjects
generates new forms of inclusion and exclusion, thereby demonstrating the precarity of
inclusion in the structural function of allopoietic worlds.

3.3

The Precarity of Inclusion: Ghost Cities and
Migrant Workers

What, exactly, is a ghost city? Or perhaps a better question would be: what is a ghost city
in China? This term has previously been reserved to describe spaces that were once
lively, booming areas of economic production which have decayed and withered away.
Indeed, China’s National Science and Technology Department’s Terminology Committee
would seem to describe ghost cities in exactly this way, as “an abandoned city with
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depleted resources, a high vacancy rate, few inhabitants, or that is dark at night.”169
Against this image, Chinese ghost cities are spaces that are dark at dawn, that “have yet
to come to life” and thus are epitomized by complete potentiality.170 Indeed, although the
construction of these sites appear to follow China’s privileging of space over
commodities, the fact that they remain relatively underpopulated and unproductive
sometimes a decade after completion would seem to suggest an excess of development.
While there is no immediate need for their construction, with China’s middle-class
expecting to reach 800 million people by 2025 the hope is that these ready-made
cityscapes will pre-emptively serve the needs of the future economy.171 And it is this
future necessity that Stephen Roach claims critics of China’s ghost cities miss all together
when he writes that “China cannot afford to wait to build its new cities […] instead
investment and construction must be aligned with the future influx of urban dwellers.”172
However, with their emphasis on the future, the current spectral nature of these urban
developments bare an uncanny resemblance to the identity of speculative financial
capitalism: namely, a logic of production for production’s sake akin to the production of
profit from profit itself.
It is interesting to note that both spectre and speculate share a common linguistic root,
specere, or the Latin verb ‘to look’. Thus, when thought through ghost cities and
speculative financial capitalism both terms can be seen to present a common vision that
comes about as a dis-appearance, occurrences that risk being suspended between the real
and unreal, the present and an uncertain potential future. To repeat once more the quote
from Slavoj Žižek “it is crucial to avoid the simple commonsense [sic] solution: ‘we have
to get rid of the speculators, introduce order there, and real production will go on’ – the
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lesson of capitalism is that these “unreal” speculators are real here; if we remove them
the reality of production suffers.”173 The lesson of ghost cities, then, presents itself in an
inverted but analogous way: the “real” material content of these urban spaces is “unreal”.
While the current reality of their production further stimulates growth demanded by and
for China’s new socius, for the time being the function of these spaces is suspended,
awaiting a future, artificial reterritorialization by those able to fill the space. What is even
more striking than this, however, is that the local municipalities who orchestrate the
construction of ghost cities do even not try to hide their state of dis-appearance. Rather,
these new districts are flaunted for their potential to house luxury commercial sectors and
apartments, presenting China with a new ideal for its future that writes out the anxiety of
its transformation.174 In this sense, ghost-cities allow us to catch a rare glimpse into the
prosopopoeial and onomatopoeial processes demanded by local world’s non-specific
structural accommodation of the global and specific organization and identity of financial
capitalism.
In his book Ghost Cities of China, Shepard writes about his experience walking through
the Great Orient Mall in Zhengdong, a massive shopping complex without a single shop
open for business: “We [Shepard and a security guard] walked together into the belly of
the empty mall. Fake signs for Western stores lined both sides of the hallway to
demonstrate what this place could look like if it actually had any business in it. KFC,
Starbucks, Zara, Adidas and Nike were all represented…”175 In this one description we
already witness a qualifying property of ghost cities’ potentiality. These new spaces are
not accessible to everyone, but aimed at a particular type of subject: it is those people
have truly become modern, middle and upper class poietic subjects that can fill these
empty cities with life by being able to afford to actualize its ready-made commercial
meaning. In this way, with the provisional standing-in of the logos of multinational
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corporations the global identity of capital is made present, articulating those who can and
cannot partake in its space, or a prosopopoeial process which comes to stand in for
identity. But the fact is that in their current state ghost cities are speculative spaces for a
reason other than their un-actualized economic potential. Namely, it is their reliance on
“the lives of the urban ‘other’, [sic] that is the nongmingong [migrant labourers]” whose
identities, straddling the line of inclusionary-exclusionary, imbue these spaces with a
quality of non-belonging.176
The success of China’s reform process and its allopoietic transformation is inextricably
tied to the complex history and identity of migrant labourers.177 The literal translation of
the term nongmingong either as farmer worker or peasant worker reveals much about the
dislocation of these people. Comprising approximately 270 million individuals, 178
migrant workers travel from the countryside to urban developments and carry an
ambiguous status of (non)belonging as they are deprived of the rights secured by their
local household registration of the Hukou system.179 The Hukou system originated in
1958 during the CCP’s first push for industrialization. It served both as an index to
register and divide rural and urban production as well as to implement “a system of social
control aimed at excluding the rural population from access to state-provided goods,
welfare, and entitlements” of urban areas by tying individuals’ access to services with
their area of registration.180 This system continues to make it virtually impossible for an
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individual registered in a rural Hukou to permanently relocate outside of their home
designation.
However, starting with the opening up of the SEZ in the 1980’s the surplus-demand for
cheap manual labour in the areas of construction and factory production led the CCP to
allow “temporary contract workers” from rural areas to migrate to urban areas.181 And
the industrial demand for these labourers has essentially split Chinese citizenry in two:
again, those who comprise modern and urban poietic subjects, and those ‘other’ secondclass citizens who are not only allowed but encouraged to fill undesirable labour
positions in developing cities so as to fulfill production demands. Thus, while migrant
labourers are ‘free’ to seek higher wages abroad, in so doing these workers lose not only
the social security but legal status of their home. It is precisely in this sense that migrant
workers come to embody a state of non-belonging, which essentially exiles them from
any sense of fixed identity within the larger framework of China’s reforms—their
identity, although necessary, falls outside those whose interests support the socius of
China in the situation of contemporary global modernity.
As can be seen in the work of film maker Jia Zhangke, the precarious nature of this new
reality has not been lost on the Chinese people. His films focus almost exclusively on
migrant workers’ attempts and failures to form new, lasting identities in urban areas as
they simultaneously work in, and are excluded from, the rituals of social, public and
commercial space. His 2004 drama Shijie, translated as The World, is particularly telling
in this regard. Set in a fictional Beijing, The World centers on an amusement park of the
same name to tell the story of migrant workers who are hired to inhabit and perform in
replicas of landmarks from around the globe. The film pays particular attention to space
that is both worked on by migrant workers and that works on them. Commenting on the
effect of this dialectic, Jing Nie writes that “as subjects, they experience a double
displacement in the park: they move from the countryside to Beijing where they are
surrounded, not by an urban Chinese culture, but by a fake and inaccessible global micro-
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environment.”182 It is difficult to ignore the parallel between the environments of migrant
workers in The World Park with what has already been described about the localizing
world of ghost cities as an example of the prosopopoeial process demanded in the poietic
structuring of worlds. As for the subjects themselves, the strained and turbulent
relationship of the film’s two main characters, Xiaotao and her boyfriend Taisheng,
presents a cautionary tale about the impossibility for these individuals to create a private
sphere at the margins of society – a space in which, as Hannah Arendt once described,
“through friendship, sympathy and love, we can cope more or less adequately with mere
human existence.”183 And the ambiguous death of Xiaotao and Taisheng at the end of the
film, which could be read either as a suicide or the failure of these subjects to withstand
the adverse effects of an all-consuming global identity imposing itself in a local space,
points to the costs of reducing the migrant work force to human capital: they are included
in the global autopoietic organization of capitalism, but excluded from the local,
allopoietic world of China, and thus serve only a role of application, not implication.
We began our first section by briefly considering the impact of the “Made in China” story
that is both celebrated and a cause of anxiety in the landscape of contemporary global
modernity. However, if we are to truly engage with China’s recent past and understand
how the lives of migrant workers figure into this history, then it is necessary to
acknowledge the other half of this narrative: namely, the “Made for China” story. While
the rapid reconfiguration of the Chinese landscape may be presented to the world with the
construction of new, futuristic skylines, and with it a new allopoietic world, the integral
function but displaced identity of migrant workers within this process appears to
complicate our notion that identity within the situation of contemporary global modernity
exists ‘together-with-time, everywhere, just-now.’ In the West we too quickly forget that
the foundation of our economies rests on the backs of underpaid, disadvantaged
labourers. When China’s reform process is cast as an exception to the rule of global
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modernity, this exception comes in the form of a fantasy – a desire to rewrite our past and
secure the founding myth of our age: that the pursuit of profit, and the production of
profit from profit itself, is a peaceful endeavour accessible to everyone. With the story of
migrant workers, we have created a new ghostly caste that is necessary to both sustain
growth locally in China, and produce cheap, ready-made commodities globally. Thus, to
our analysis of the spatial creative destruction enacted through China’s reform process
and its means of securing the production of a new socius for China’s allopoietic world
must be added the dimension of history, tradition and its onomatopoeial transformation.

3.4
“Everybody has their own Dream”: Nail-House
Protests and the Violence of Exclusion184
With the construction of Chinese ghost cities and their reliance upon migrant workers we
saw how this new urban phenomena embodies the manner in which the local allopoietic
accommodation of a capitalist socius forces individuals into a new role of application
within a national world. Their labour, although demanded by the tenants of China’s new
socius, nevertheless excludes them from the spaces they constructed. Thus, while migrant
workers’ labour tends towards the production of the structural dimension of allopoietic
worlds, they remain on the margins, in a permanent position of precarity. For our second
urban phenomena of dingzihu or nail-house protests, however, China’s new poietic
landscape entails a different relationship: namely, a fear for the disappearance of
traditional culture and personal history.185 Nail-house protests arise as a desperate
attempt of individuals to hold onto their personal history and communities as traditional
urban spaces are demolished to make way for rational, economic districts. The effects of
the economic, social, and political reforms upon the people of China, have therefore
shifted from anxiety about the future to a mourning of the past. By recounting two stories
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of nail-houses protests we shall connect the dislocation of individuals from their home –
and ensuing loss of their identity–this section will demonstrate the violence of exclusion
born from resisting the prosopopoeial and onomatopoeial process of allopoietic world
creation. We shall connect these stories to Hannah Arendt’s critique in her essay “‘The
Rights of Man’: What are they?” of the modern public sphere as a space where “men
cannot act or change at all.”186 As the collapsing of the traditional public and private
sphere for the sake of economic interest in China levels down the identity of personal
difference to create national homogeneity, it is only fitting that we allow the voices of
nail-house inhabitants to speak to their lived experiences.
The point here is neither to moralize these acts of resistance as noble efforts against the
universalizing force of globalization or the universality of contemporary global
modernity, nor is it to theorize precisely how resistance arises. Rather, it is to investigate
the vital role of history and narrative within the poietic structuring of worlds demanded
by the situation of contemporary global modernity, and how the loss of one’s history can
be understood as intolerable act. It is precisely this point that allows us to link Deleuze
and Guattari’s concept of the socius with Lyotard’s dual notions of the Heim, or home,
and pagus, or border zones. By thinking these concepts together, we can understand how
space, language, and history, or actions, thoughts and identity are enchained within a
world by deferring confrontations to a border zone, a boundary or environment. The
phenomena of nail-house protests present us with a striking image of this process, as in
many cases a single house will remain of an entire neighbourhood and community,
forming a literal boundary between the old and the new.
If the 2008 Beijing Olympics was a display of China’s successful entry into the world
economy, then the 2010 World Expo in Shanghai demonstrated that the country had once
again become a global power.187 The city used the event to justify a decade long process
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of reconstruction and development of the business district along the Huangpu River,
resulting in it being granted the title of a ‘global city.’188 During the late 19th and early
20th century this area was named the “Bund”, or alliance in German, by Western banks
and countries who used it to establish a soft colonial presence in China. Therefore, what
better place to reveal the image of ‘the next great global city’ at an international event
whose theme was “Better City, Better Life”?189
For the inhabitants along the Huangpu River, however, forced evictions became a routine
part of life as entire urban communities were reclaimed to support the public interest of
Shanghai, a popular slogan used in proxy for the reform policies of the Chinese
government. Though technically Chinese law stipulates that “all persons should possess a
degree of security of tenure which guarantees legal protection against forced eviction,
harassment and other threats,” since the founding of the People’s Republic of China the
CCP has owned all the land.190 While an individual may own their home, a common case
in traditional urban communities where houses are inter-generational spaces, the land a
house sits on can be requisitioned at any moment for minimal compensation. And yet
despite the legality of the relocation process in Shanghai, when the time came for
inhabitants to leave their homes and lives behind some refused.
This was the case of Mr. Han and his family who vocally cried out against the actions of
Shanghai while attempting to go on with their lives in what remained of their community.
Mr. Han told his family’s story to a reporter from the Daily Telegraph: “My house was
on the main site of the expo. They waited until we left home one day and then knocked it
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down. I have not had any payment for my property and, because I complained, my son
was refused entrance to university and the army. I am unemployed, and so is my wife and
son. We live on the bare minimum.”191 In this case, we can understand the effects of
opposing the redevelopment of Shanghai as a double displacement. Mr. Han’s family lost
not only their past lives as it was embodied by their home and community, but moreover
the possibility of integrating themselves into the fabric of the new Shanghai. So unlike
the migrant worker who experiences a loss of self by labouring in a space they cannot be
accepted into, one of the risks of nail-house protests is being forced to inhabit a place that
was once yours but in a new public sphere that refuses to accept you. To understand the
violence brought about through the transformation of one’s home into a border zone, a
liminal space of exclusion which destroys one’s history, let us now turn to Lyotard’s
discursive analysis of language and history, his concept of the pagus and its relationship
to a home for a subject’s auto-identification.
In the ‘Enjeu’ or ‘Stakes’ section of The Differend, Lyotard begins with the following
statement: “to convince the reader […] that thought, cognition [connaissance], ethics,
politics, history, being, depending on the case, are in play within the enchaining of phrase
onto phrase.”192 There is, already, a twofold interruption of language and signification at
work within this statement. First, the unity and the sense of coming to agreement over a
definite meaning within language is abandoned by the suspended series that Lyotard
presents between thought, the enterprise of reason, and being, the conditions of
possibility. The implications here are that language must be extricated from any possible
position of neutrality, the sense that language simply ‘is’ and shows ‘what there is’.
Indeed, Lyotard writes that “there is no ‘language’ in general, except as the object of an
Idea.”193 We will recall from our discussion of the socius that its formation comes about
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precisely as a means to provide a specific re-codification of an existing society, one
where an organizing principle, or Idea, is elevated to an a priori, universal condition for
life which falls back on those who exist within it. Thinking this movement through
Lyotard’s first statements, we can already understand a further qualification of the socius:
its guiding principle, such as capital, forcibly falls back on language as such,
transforming it into an object through which the universality of capital may be known.
Through this process, the play between thought, cognition, ethics, and so on, may enter
into a free accord as the condition of possibility of every determinate relationship, as the
presuppositions between the enchaining of phrases, but in so doing the meaning of each
phrase regime is exposed to a reordering based upon their transformation into the object
of an ideal: capital.
This brings us to the second interruption: that language always implies a use and involves
a certain measure of violence that is brought about through the enchaining (not simply
linking but the subordination and enslaving of possibilities) of phrase onto phrase.
Lyotard continues in ‘Enjeu’: “to refute the prejudice anchored in the reader by centuries
of humanism and of ‘human sciences’ that there is ‘man’, that there is ‘language’, that
man makes use of language for his ends [que celui-là se sert celui-ci], that if he does not
succeed in attaining those ends, it is owing to a lack of good control over language ‘by
means’ of a ‘better’ language.”194 Let us note Lyotard’s use of the verb servir. While the
English translation renders ‘se sert’ into ‘makes use of’, the verb also has connotations of
dutiful obligation, as in serving a community, as well as being forced into servitude,
enchaining in the literally sense of enslavement. Thus, if there is no language in general
except as the object of an Idea, it is owing to the position of language as the object of the
Idea of humanity. But we would argue that insofar as humanity has become inextricably
intertwined with capital, with the formation of local, allopoietic sociuses, language is
made use of in servitude to the ends of capital by enchaining phrase onto phrase and with
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each chain foreclosing the play of phrase regimens. Lyotard moves in this direction when
he claims that there are, initially and for the most part, two ends of language.
On the exterior, we have “the genre of economic discourse” that makes use of language
within exchange, circulation, and the accumulation of capital (continuous enchaining of
phrases, or generating profit from profit itself) for the sake of succeeding in gaining and
earning time. We can think this notion of economic discourse qua exteriority through
Varela’s statement that the global identity of an autopoietic machine is not immediately
present with or to local components: that its signification must be made present as it does
not immediately generate a localized self. Within the interior, “the genre of academic
discourse”, the sense of mastering language so as to neutralize meaning in general such
that it reflects a particular order of reality and prevents the dispersion of thought.195 This
neutralization, when thought together with the re-ordering of phrase regimes in service of
an Idea, brings about another level of significance to the socius’ process of miraculation.
In its apparent objectivity and elevation of an Idea to a quasi-cause, the socius captures
the diffusion of thought locally within its-self for the sake of securing a principle which is
altogether exterior to it. When subsumed within the situation of contemporary global
modernity these two trends can be understood as an injunction to capture reality within a
local nonspecific socius, thereby producing a universal and specific presentation of itsself ‘together-with-time, everywhere, just-now.’ Against this understanding of language
as forming the object of an Idea, that makes use of it to present its-self just now for the
sake of producing conditions of possibility that appear everywhere, together with time,
Lyotard seeks to “defend and illustrate philosophy in its differend […] by showing that
the enchaining of phrase onto phrase is problematic and that this problem is politics.”196
It is here that Lyotard delineates the true stakes of his project: to bear witness to the
differend as a philosophical politics that allows the play of thought, cognition, ethics,
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politics, history, being, in such a way that it does not bear on the content of reflection, a
positive iteration of an order of reality. Rather, and as he will write in “Address,” the
differend, or differends, “concerns (and tampers) with [reflection’s] ultimate
presuppositions. Reflection calls us to be on guard for occurrences, that we do not already
know what will arrive.”197 Differends, then, can be defined as a case of conflict between
heterogeneous parties without resolution, to which we cannot be indifferent, but neither
can we presume to decide, for this would be to use language for the sake of …. Rather,
the differend calls us to be on guard, to alter the presuppositions of reflection and suspend
judgement, such that what is at stake on the outside comes to inflect the interior of
reflection itself, the differends which emerge in an event. Nail-house protests can be
understood precisely as an event producing differends, insofar as the history, narratives
and identities which emerge present a situation without resolution insofar as the worlds of
the protestors and that of the new allopoietic socius of China are fundamentally
incommensurable. This is also why we cannot moralize these acts. Resistance is
necessary, but the means through which it arises cannot be universalized. To clarify
Lyotard’s position and the abstract conclusions we have arrived at by situating the
differend within his discussion of narrative, myth, and the event which opens the chapter
“The Signs of History” before returning to our discussion of nail-house protests and their
implication for the local world of China.
“The Signs of History” begins on the margins, in the liminal space of the pagus. It allows
both passage from the interior to the outside, in the sense of a border, while also firmly
separating the interior from the exterior, in the sense of a boundary. In the opening
paragraphs of this chapter Lyotard will implicate his twofold delineation of the relation of
discursive ex-interiority in his notion of the pagus. To this end, he enchains language as
the ends of the success of commerce directly to language as the ends of the success of
mastery, or war: “A phrase, which enchains, and which is to be enchained, is always a
pagus, a border and confinement zone where genres of discourse enter into conflict over
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the mode of linking. War and commerce.”198 Lyotard will mark this interior/exterior
distinction by way of separating the pagus from the Heim, home, and the Volk. The
home, then, is the site where the people shut themselves in and where an internal peace
may be achieved through the suspension of differends. “An ‘internal’ peace is bought at
the price of perpetual differends on the borders,” Lyotard writes, and “(the same
arrangement goes for the ego, that of auto-identification.) This internal peace is made
through narratives that accredit the community of proper names as they accredit
themselves.”199 Let us linger here for a moment and expand on the phrases ‘narrative’
and ‘auto-identification’.
Lyotard explains in the next paragraph that narrative is a genre of discourse where
heterogeneous phrase regimes and even other genres of discourse are difficult to
recognize, or rather, that they go unnoticed. In this sense, “narrative recounts a differend
or differends and imposes an end on it or them, a completion which is also its own term.
Its finality is to come to an end.”200 Thus, and as we will further explore, the home is the
space of the public sphere par excellence, a space where individuals and persons cannot
act or change at all insofar as their identity has already been re-coded by the formation of
the socius. To this end, Lyotard makes a subtle distinction in French between the
narrative genre, le récit indicating a calling forth that puts into motion again, and la
fonction narrative, the narrative function that is ‘redeeming in itself’ insofar as it has
already settled the accounts of that which it calls forth. Everything has been settled by
enchaining phrases together that are made use of for ‘auto-identification’, an identity that
is stable and repeating: auto-identification as and for one’s-self, repeating in a closed
circuit that displaces differends to the borders and confines, a space to identify one’s-self
against. Through the mechanism of repetition and identification, narratives function by
domesticating the now within a recurrence of the before and after, which is to say, a

198

Ibid, 151. Translation modified.

199

Ibid, 151.

200

Ibid, 151.

93

history that provides consistency to the poietic subject and solace to the community
insofar as this history is already redeeming in itself and continuously calls the community
into motion within itself. Narrative is that which allows time to go on uninterrupted: the
genre of discourse makes use of diachronic structures and diegetic modes of presentation
to bring about the finality of the object of an Idea, to gain mastery over time in a way that
is self-relating for the constitution of a local home and socius. This is best exemplified by
narrative’s relationship to the event, a relationship that will allow us to return to nailhouse protests in China.
Narrative, Lyotard writes, “pushes the event back to the border and confines.”201
Narrative displaces the event, for the sake of securing a Heim, a home, the birth of an
allopoietic world connecting to, and disjuncting and conjuncting with a global and
specific autopoietic organization. If we think of the emergence of nail-house protests
precisely as an event, we can understand how the poietic structuring of worlds relies on
historical and narrative displacement to write out the violence of its production at the
same moment it enacts this violence. Personal homes, communities, and histories must be
excluded for the sake of securing new names of history, and allow for processes of social
auto-identification. To repeat Mr. Han’s description of his family’s new life, “I have not
had any payment for my property and, because I complained, my son was refused
entrance to university and the army. I am unemployed, and so is my wife and son. We
live on the bare minimum.” Their existence has directly come to embody the status of a
pagus, a differendial border zone, a zone of exclusion without home and without
resolution, an environment which disrupts the functioning of China’s new socius and
local, allopoietic world. With such stark consequences the question arises as to why
individuals would risk staging a nail-house protest? Our second testimony speaks to logic
of resistance in China’s new allopoietic landscape.
In the fall of 2013, the city of Taizhou was in the middle of being rebuilt. An urban space
whose history spans back to the Han dynasty that originated in the 3rd century BCE, the
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totalizing project of redevelopment in Taizhou witnessed “the ancient neighbourhood of
meandering alleyways and age-old old brick homes that covered this area […] cleared
away, effectively erased from the slate of modern China.”202 At this time only a single
house remained, occupied by 8 members and 4 generations of the Zhang family whose
ancestors first came to Taizhou 300 years earlier.203 Wade Shepard interviewed Mrs.
Zhang about her family’s experience, their history, and what they would say to Wang
Jianlin, the CEO of the company charged with the reconstruction of Taizhou and one of
the wealthiest individuals in China, about their situation:
‘We have not left the house in three months’, Mrs. Zhang told me ‘because if
we do they will destroy it. We have someone bring food in to us.’ […] ‘In
China’, Mrs. Zhang continued, ‘when people don’t have a house they have
nothing. […] I asked Mrs. Zhang what she would say to Wang Jianlin if she
had the opportunity: ‘I would tell him that everybody has their own dream,
not everyone wants to live in an apartment. […] This represents our roots’,
she said. ‘Chinese culture cannot be replaced by money. What a pity to
destroy this.’ A week or so later the eviction squad showed up. ‘It was around
three in the morning. They closed off the street and a hundred police in riot
gear charged in’, a man who witnessed the event told me. […] The Zhang
family went down with their ship.204
Between Wade Shepard’s description of Taizhou and Mrs. Zhang’s statements we are
able to glimpse into the complex matrix that constituted traditional Chinese identity in
urban communities. It would be a superficial procedure to try and parse apart the personal
and private narrative of a family’s roots in their old-brick homes from the hutong, those
public alleyways where identities are formed by residents who “smell and taste each
other’s meals and exchange help and favors.”205 In precisely this way, when Mrs. Zhang
equates the absence of a home to having nothing, she evokes the symbiotic nature of
belonging in traditional urban communities where the private realm extends out into
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public space, so individuals simultaneously shape and are shaped by common rituals,
practices and values.
Zhang Yang’s 1999 film Xizao, or Shower, is instructive in this regard. Set during
the restructuring and rebuilding of Beijing in the 1990’s, Shower tells the story of a
family run bathhouse in a traditional urban community. It acts as a nexus between the
public and private, as it “is not only a place to become clean, but also a social place
where neighbors gather, exchange news, help and entertain each other.”206 Master Liu,
the patriarch of the family who runs the community bathhouse, represents the heart and
history of this society; in addition to performing traditional Chinese acupuncture and
bathing rituals he serves as a mediator for his clients’ and neighbours’ conflicts ranging
from disputes over cricket fights to a couple’s fraught marriage. While some critics have
lauded the film for constructing a self-orientalising fantasy, the power of this film comes
precisely in its unwillingness to stage the life of its community, and thus traditional life as
a whole, as a harmonious and yet diverse environment, where everyone has their place
and all are de facto accepted into the fabric of social life.207 The point is that precisely
because the private affairs of individuals extend out into the public spaces of the
bathhouse and hutongs, social order in Shower’s traditional community is not a
destructive force solely bent on “eliminating or reducing to a minimum the dark
background of difference” as Arendt describes – rather, this extension guarantees a
minimal space and potential for heterogeneous identities to continuously be
(re)negotiated and affirmed.208 However, when Master Liu dies at the end of the film, so
too does the history and life of the community. As the last scene of the film depicts the
once lively area reduced to rubble and a silent resignation of its inhabitants, Shower
ultimately signals the irreversibility of economic development and the inability of the old
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world of China to survive its allopoietic accommodation of contemporary global
modernity.
From the time in which Mr. Han’s family staged their protest in the early 2000’s
to Mrs. Zhang’s resistance in 2013, the historical foundation for the poietic structuring of
China’s world drastically changed. This change can be represented by the ideological
shift from President Hu Jintao’s totalizing platform of “Harmonious Society” that was
established in 2002, to current President Xi Jinping’s universal proclamation of the
“Chinese Dream” in 2013. In the first case, the insistence on harmony indicates the
theoretical possibility for a plurality of voices to be tolerated within the transitional goals
of economic reform; in the second, however, polyphony has been replaced by
monophony. Through the prosopopoeial process of making the global and specific
identity of autopoietic capitalism present, the local national demand for and ‘public
interest’ in this process brings about a new private and non-specific identity which
collapses onto the older history and tradition of communities and individuals. This is the
onomatopoeial logic of the allopoietic structuring of local worlds at work, a process of
naturalization which not only presents the situation ‘just now’, but represents it as always
already having tended towards this course. History, then, is continuously re-written, reshaped to displace the violence of this becoming-other to the margins, or boundaries. A
new origin is inscribed into the fabric of the socius, such that the discontinuities which
present themselves as incommensurable differends can be written out of the new
arrangement of a socius. This is why in A Thousand Plateaus, Deleuze and Guattari write
that “History is made only by those who oppose history (not by those who insert
themselves into it, or even reshape it). […] History may try to break its ties to memory; it
may make the schemas of memory more elaborate, superpose and shift coordinates,
emphasize connections, or deepen breaks.”209 And here, we must be willing to push this
logic to its end if we are to understand the differing fates of Mr. Han and Mrs. Zhang’s
families.
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Thus, while Mr. Han’s family was forcefully evicted in their nail-house protest, for the
sake of ‘harmony’ they were at least permitted to remain on the pagus of Chinese society,
where they now represent “nothing but his own absolutely unique individuality” and are
reduced to conditions of bare-life in the new Shanghai, differends in the purest sense.210
For Mrs. Zhang and her family, however, their belief that ‘everybody has their own
dream’ and their desire to retain their personal and communal history regrettably misrecognizes that it is no longer a question of Chinese culture being replaced with the
pursuit of profit. In the new Chinese Dream, expressed through the narrative of its Heim
and the function of its socius, Chinese culture and the pursuit and production of profit
have become inseparable for the sake of producing a world. The historical origin and
development of China’s world is rearranged as a full body, a full world where
ontologically, everything seems to be objectively produced by capital in the sense that the
entirety of being and history has led to its development; politically, the relationship
between the social, political, cultural, public and privates spheres of its local world are reinscribed in the image of capital itself; and socially, those who do not comply fall out of
this new, local history, are no longer permitted to be together with others. In this sense,
nail-house inhabitants are at best relegated to the pagus of the new Chinese socius,
where, to extend Rachel Bath’s theory of world-shifting to the realm of politics and
society, their existence and their world end up being suspended between what once was
and what is yet to come.211 Their differendial status forcibly transforms them into
ontological, political, social and cultural remainders, a caste with no-place who stand out
in the new, allopoietic world of China.
In this situation of contemporary global modernity it is no longer the case that, as Arendt
maintained, the public sphere is a space where individuals cannot act or change at all.
Rather, they can only act and change by becoming-other, allow themselves, their
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families, communities and institutions to be structured by the non-specific identity of
citizens demanded by the global and specific economic or cease to exist. In this way
globalization forces the creation of local national worlds that are highly antagonistic to all
others, including those within their own space. The truly global dimension of capitalism
arrives in its ability to nullify not only rural provincialism, but urban diversity. And is
there not a better image to demonstrate this than the negative spatiality of the nail-house,
representing an inverted modern skyline where the space of private dwelling refuses to be
levelled down to public, economic necessity? In 1955 Claude Lévi-Strauss already
warned against this phenomena in his Triste Tropiques. He writes that “mankind has
opted for monoculture; it is in the process of creating a mass civilization, as beetroot is
grown in the mass. Henceforth man’s daily bill of fare will consist only of this one
item.”212 In the end this one item is the recursive generation of profit, the production of
new, local allopoietic worlds embodying the abstractive creative destruction of the global
production of profit from profit itself and the exile from contemporary global modernity
of those who refuse to comply with this specific autopoietic organization.
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4

Conclusion

Do we still live in a world? In the situation of contemporary global modernity, the answer
to this question at first appears uncertain. Initially and for the most part, the abstractive
processes of global financial capitalism and the correlative processes of globalization
present us with an effective totalization of life defined by the production of profit from
profit itself. The possibilities of how we come to know our-selves are thus captured by
the perspective of what there is, materially, in a globe. This a movement that conflates the
world generally and worlds specifically with the spatial object of the globe, thereby
reducing the living and created relationality of meaning in which individuals, persons,
and communities are implicated, through which they come to care for one another, and
within which they come to understand their-selves and their identity. In this sense, the
situation of contemporary global modernity is marred by a series of ontological misalliances: first, between the becoming political of the social and the becoming social of
the political; second, between the becoming economic of the cultural and the becoming
cultural of the economic; and third, between these two sets of mis-alliances themselves,
wherein economics comes to determine not only the production of culture, but nullifies
the potential for social or political autonomy. Therefore, a uniform global horizon is
produced within which local politics always already guarantees a culture that
continuously conforms to the actualization of profit ‘together-with-time-everywhere-justnow’. A first step towards overcoming this deadlock arrives in an injunction to think
politics and ontology together as a means to reconsider not what there is in a globe, but
how we are here in a world.
In this sense, the situation of contemporary global modernity necessitates a poietic
structuring of worlds and identities for its coherence. The poietic structuring of worlds
and identities entails the unification of thought and action in a particular time and space
so as to continue a local world, even though this unification is founded on a becomingother, a series of ontological, political, and historical discontinuities without breaks. The
poietic structuring of worlds and identities is doubly marked by autopoietic and
allopoietic processes of connection, disjunction, conjunction, and reciprocal causality.
Through their functioning, the global, autopoietic formation of financial capitalism is
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simultaneously situated in the local, allopoietic worlds while these local allopoietic
worlds tend towards the re-production of global, autopoietic capitalism. From a
philosophical perspective, one the implications of this double movement is that identity
and worlds must be understood as co-arising with one another at the local, allopoietic
level, as a means to make global financial capitalism’s autopoietic identity present within
local space and histories, a prosopopoeial process. A second implication, then, is that far
from representing a natural order that is self-producing and tending towards material selfcompletion, or auto-finality, the survival of autopoietic capitalism is predicated on its
continuous accommodation and production in local spaces, histories, worlds and
identities, an onomatopoeial process. A third implication is that identities and worlds
must continuously re-arrange themselves, thereby re-codifying ontological, political and
social dimensions of inclusion and exclusion for the sake of existing ‘together-with-timeeverywhere-just-now’.
Therefore, from a political and practical perspective, thinking the poietic structuring of
worlds and identities in the situation of contemporary global modernity provides us with
a new framework to consider how boundaries, borders, inclusion and exclusion locally
function. In this regard, the identity of poietic subjects, their communities, and ways of
life are continuously in a process of becoming-other. Identity and world are uprooted
from traditional, landed tied to space and time, and re-ordered according to the global
demands of autopoietic capitalism, whose organizational processes must be structurally
accommodated to produce an experience of everyone and everything existing ‘togetherwith-time, everywhere, just-now’ for the sake of generating profit from profit itself. In
this way a singular mode of dwelling is produced and instantiated which comes to
privilege the economic application rather than existential and communal implication of
individuals and persons in their world.
While I have elucidated a new framework of poietic structuring to understand the coarising of world and identity in the situation of contemporary global modernity, its
presentation necessarily remains incomplete. As such, I will now outline possible
objections to my project. While these objections highlight the shortcomings of my current
project, it is my belief that they do not present unresolvable problems for its framework.
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Rather, these objections provide us with future avenues for research, and underscore the
continuing possibilities within which our understanding of the co-arising of world and
identity in the situation of contemporary global modernity can be expanded.
Owing to the predominantly transcendental nature of my presentation I have outlined
what could be referred to as the macro-processes of the poietic structuring of worlds and
identities. The foregoing presentation, then, could be objected to, first, on the grounds of
what Maurice Merleau-Ponty describes as la pensée de survol or ‘high-altitude thinking’,
a mode of analysis resulting from the position of an ‘observing-subject’ rather than an
embodied, limited subjectivity.213 In this sense, a philosophical mode of inquiry has
come to eclipse more immediate political categories and concerns. The danger of this
operation is that in trying to understand identity, world, politics, and ontology as a poietic
structuring, I have simply repeated the violence of subjecting these experiences to the
universalizing demands of autopoietic capitalism. Indeed, while emphasizing the
interplay between the global level of autopoietic capitalism and the local, allopoietic
levels of nations and states, and to a lesser degree, communities and individuals, a second
objection arrives that I have necessarily elided discussions of other recursive levels and
formations, such as gender, race, or even a detailed exploration of class outside of my
discussion of migrant labourers in China. While outside the scope of my current thesis, a
consideration of how racial, gendered, and class formations come to inform one’s
experience of their-selves and their worlds is a crucial avenue for thinking history,
becoming, borders and boundaries beyond their homogenizing national dimensions.
A rethinking of allopoietic world creation from these perspectives would allow us to
empirically incorporate a thinking of structural dimensions of power, alongside
environmental potential for allopoietic worlds to create themselves otherwise than
according to an accommodation of global, autopoietic capitalism. I would claim the
groundwork for this future work is already contained in my discussions of the
prosopopoeial and onomatopoeial processes of allopoietic world creation, insofar as what
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is at stake are concerns of spatial embodiment and onto-political naturalization. By
expanding my discussions of poietic embodiment to other forms of embodied
subjectivity, I would be able to resolve the transcendental obfuscation of eminently
political issues.
This brings us to our final objection, namely, the minimization of resistance and its lack
of theoretical exploration. This may appear especially troubling when thought through
my statements regarding resistance in my third chapter. There, I claimed that the
resistance of nail-house protests must not be moralized. My point was not to dismiss their
efforts, nor to argue that their attachment to their homes and histories could be seen as a
nostalgic lamentation for something already lost. Rather, I claimed that moralizing nailhouse protests itself comes to form a universalizing act that seeks in particular events a
totalizing formula that could simply be applied to and repeated in future situations. Thus,
future work will have to seriously implicate resistance within the poietic structuring of
worlds if we are to avoid a theorization of world and identity in which poietic subjects are
completely determined by their allopoietic world formations. This means, in my view,
elaborating a politics of sincerity. From the Latin root, sinceritatem, sincerity in the
situation of contemporary global modernity would mean the implication of wholeness
rather than authenticity, from the Greek autos and hentes, or a being whose identity is
based on self-doing. Insofar as the self is always in a process of becoming-other, and the
fact that worlds and identity co-arise with one another, a politics of sincerity, to recall
Maturana and Varela’s statement, “compels us to see that the world will be different only
if we live differently.”214 And in this sense, living differently means replacing the
structural autos of poietic subjects, with a new organizational allos, a new organization of
living together.
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